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ABSTRACT
Muppavarapu, Vineela. Ph. D., Department of Computer Science and Engineering,
Wright State University, 2009. Semantic and Role-based Access Control for Data Grid
Systems.
A Grid is an integration infrastructure for sharing and coordinated use of diverse
resources in dynamic, distributed virtual organizations (VOs). A Data Grid is an
architecture for the access, exchange, and sharing of data in the Grid environment.
Distributed data resources can be diverse in their formats, schema, quality, access
mechanisms, ownership, access policies, and capabilities. In recent years, several
organizations have started utilizing Grid technologies to deploy data-intensive and/or
computation-intensive applications. As more and more organizations are sharing data
resources and participating in Data Grids, the complexity and heterogeneity of the
systems is increasing constantly, but their management techniques are not evolving
making the systems more complicated and error-prone, indicating a clear need for
standardized mechanisms to manage access control for the shared data resources.
The Open Grid Services Architecture - Data Access and Integration (OGSA-DAI)
and the Storage Resource Broker (SRB) are widely used frameworks for the integration
of heterogeneous data resources in Data Grid systems. However, in these systems, access
control causes substantial administration overhead for the resource providers because the
authorization information has to be maintained for individual Grid users. In addition,
access control policies need to specified and managed across multiple organizations.
And, each organization in a Data Grid may use its own terminology to describe a
resource making it difficult to coordinate between the organizations.
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This dissertation focuses on solving these problems and provides access control
systems that are based on existing standards. We developed a role-based access control
(RBAC) system with Shibboleth, which is an attribute authorization service currently
being used in many Grid applications. We used the Core and Hierarchical RBAC profile
of the eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) standard for specifying
access control policies uniformly across different organizations. For distributed
administration of those policies, we used the Object, Metadata and Artifacts Registry
(OMAR). OMAR is based on the e-business eXtensible Markup Language (ebXML)
registry specifications developed to achieve interoperable registries and repositories.
We developed a semantic-based access control method using the ontology to
resolve the semantic differences in terminologies. Understanding the semantics of the
data being protected is often helpful in determining which users can access the data and
what access level the users can have. Web Ontology Language (OWL) is used to
represent the ontology of the data resources and users. By using ontology, VOs can
resolve the differences in their terminologies and specify access control policies based on
concepts and user roles, instead of individual data resources and user identities.
Administration of XACML policies is a difficult task because each XACML policy
has several components, and the number of XACML policies may be very large in a Data
Grid environment. However, no efficient tool is available for the creation and update of
XACML policies. So, we developed an XACML administration tool and a GUI in Java.
The tool allows the creation of XACML policies from existing RBAC policies. The tool
also provides capabilities to update or create new RBAC policies. Using this tool, the
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policy administrator can create new users, roles, data resources, and actions. It allows the
administrator to change the user-role assignment and the permissions on a role.
Our proposed access control systems allow quick and easy deployments, and
privacy protection. The systems are scalable, and support interoperability and fine-grain
access control. Administration overheads for the resource providers are reduced because
they do not need to maintain the individual user information. Moreover, our system
allows unauthorized requests to be denied before establishing a connection to the
resource, thereby reducing the connection overheads and making the data resources to be
available to authorized users. Performance analysis shows that our systems add very little
overhead to the existing security infrastructures of SRB and OGSA-DAI.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the amount of data being stored, accessed and analyzed has
increased tremendously. The advancements in hardware and software have further
facilitated the storage and access of this enormous data. In addition, the datasets are also
stored in a distributed manner and are shared by many people across several different
domains. Grid technologies and infrastructure are developed to support the sharing and
coordinated use of diverse resources in dynamic, distributed virtual organizations (VOs)
[20]. A virtual organization is termed as a set of individuals and resources across multiple
organizations (for example, a collaboration formed by two independent physical
organizations). These individuals and resources can be dynamic in nature.
A Data Grid facilitates the coordination and sharing of a large number of
geographically distributed heterogeneous datasets across different domains. Data Grid
provides a distributed system middleware that allows different communities to access and
share data, networks, and other resources in a controlled and secure manner [21]. It also
provides services for data storage, access and transfer. Data Grids support data-intensive
and computation-intensive applications. Data Grids support replica and metadata
management. The Open Grid Services Architecture - Data Access and Integration
(OGSA-DAI) and the Storage Resource Broker (SRB) are widely used frameworks for
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the integration of heterogeneous data resources in Grid systems. OGSA-DAI is a widely
used middleware infrastructure that facilitates uniform access to data resources using a
service-oriented architecture (SOA) [3]. Storage Resource Broker (SRB) [5, 64],
developed by San Diego Supercomputing Center (SDSC), is a data grid management
system that provides applications a uniform Application Programming Interface (API) to
access heterogeneous distributed storage resources.

1.1. Motivation and Problem Statement
Most of the access control mechanisms currently being used in Data Grids are
identity-based, and are not scalable for the increasing number of users and datasets. As
users and data resources join/leave the organizations frequently updating the access
control information on an individual basis would be a difficult task. As people and
policies change frequently there is no standard way of exchanging the diverse policies
across several different domains. Also, all the domains might not have the same security
policy and hence, there should be support for the diverse security policies.
Managing a common terminology and a common access control policy for the
diverse organizations involved in the Data Grid is not feasible. Thus, making it difficult
for the organizations to coordinate and share the data resources. Organizations intending
to share their data resources have to deal with these differences and make the data
resources available to the authorized personnel. Creating and updating access control
policies for all the data resources in the Data Grid, while supporting the diverse
terminologies, is a difficult task.
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In addition, a user might not want to reveal the personal information; hence,
privacy protection becomes an important issue. The current identity-based access control
mechanisms do not protect the privacy of the user. Thus, in Data Grids the access control
mechanism should not only be scalable but should also support the diverse security
policies for distributed systems, and should protect the privacy of the users. This
dissertation focuses on addressing these problems and provides a scalable access control
mechanism for accessing multiple heterogeneous datasets distributed across diverse
domains.

1.2. Our Previous Work
In [60], we described how the Community Authorization Service (CAS) [58] can
be used to enhance the security mechanism in Open Grid Services Architecture – Data
Access and Integration (OGSA-DAI) [2, 3]. In the OGSA-DAI, access control causes
substantial administration overhead for resource providers in virtual organizations (VOs),
because each of them have to manage a role-map file containing authorization
information for individual Grid users. We used the CAS provided by the Globus Toolkit
to support the RBAC within the OGSA-DAI framework. The CAS grants the
membership on VO roles to users. The resource providers then need to maintain only the
mapping information from VO roles to local database roles in the role-map files, so that
the number of entries in the role-map file is reduced dramatically.
In [61], we described how RBAC policies such as role privileges, constraints and
hierarchies can be specified and managed for a community using CAS. Our access
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control methods provide increased manageability for a large number of users and reduce
day-to-day administration tasks of the resource providers, while they maintain the
ultimate authority over their data resources. However, a single CAS server can be a
bottleneck if a large number of users attempt to access it at the same time, and it can be a
single point of failure. Also, while our system in [60, 61] provides security in terms of
access control, it does not provide privacy protection for the users because every CAS
credential contains information that identifies the user. It also does not provide support
for the diverse policies across domains.

1.3. Contributions
The contributions of this dissertation are summarized as follows:
•

We developed a role-based access control system for Data Grids using Shibboleth. By
using Shibboleth, our system allows the user to control what personal information is
released to the resource providers thereby supporting privacy protection.

•

We used eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) and Object,
Metadata and Artifacts Registry (OMAR) for the specification and administration of
access control policies across diverse administrative domains. This allows for
administering the access control policies uniformly across the diverse domains.

•

We developed a semantic-based access control system using Shibboleth, XACML
and ontology. We used OWL standard for specifying the semantics of the user
attributes and data resources. By using semantics, the differences in the terminologies
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used by the organizations can be resolved. Furthermore, the use of semantics enables
the policies to be analyzed at different levels of abstraction.
•

We developed an XACML policy administration tool for automatically generating
XACML policies from existing RBAC policies. The tool also provides capabilities to
update or create new RBAC policies.

•

Our access control systems can provide increased manageability for a large number of
users and reduce day-to-day administration tasks of the resource providers, while they
maintain the ultimate authority over their resources.

•

The implementation of the proposed systems with SRB and OGSA-DAI bring several
advantages into its authorization infrastructure. The use of XACML policy
specification dramatically reduces the number of entries to be managed in the
authorization database and updates to them need to be made far less frequently.

•

Our system evaluates each and every access request before establishing a connection
to the resource. Thereby, allowing the resource to be available for authorized users.

•

We also discuss the performance trade-offs of the proposed systems to the existing
authorization mechanisms.

1.4. Outline of the Dissertation
The outline of the dissertation as follows: Chapter 2 describes the security in Data
Grids. We also discuss the issues to be addressed while specifying access control in Data
Grids. Chapter 3 reviews our completed work of the RBAC system in a Data Grid using

5

SRB, Shibboleth and XACML. Chapter 4 describes our completed work on semantic
based access control system with OGSA-DAI, Shibboleth, XACML and ontology.
Chapter 5 summarizes the finished works, and Chapter 6 contains the future work.
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2. SECURITY IN DATA GRIDS
The three terms which are very important and often misunderstood in security are
authentication, authorization and access control. Authentication is a process that verifies
that the user is who he/she claims to be. Authorization identifies what permissions a user
can have on which resource. Access control on the other hand refers to a more general
way of controlling access to a resource, such as specifying restrictions based on time,
location, etc.
These three terms can be explained in detail using the following example.
Suppose you plan on traveling by an airplane. When you are at the airport you are asked
to show your boarding pass along with a photo-identity, such as a driver’s license or
passport. The airport officer verifies the validity of the identity and verifies the name on
the boarding pass with that on the identity. The officer also visually checks the picture on
the identity card with your face to determine whether or not you are the person you are
claiming to be. This process can be claimed as authentication. After successful
authentication, you reach the gate at which you will be boarding a plane. The boarding
pass you have contains the plane number you are supposed to board and the seat allotted
to you.
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Authorization is the process of allowing you to board a plane, which is specified
in the boarding pass and take the seat you are allotted. If you try to board a plane other
than the one mentioned in the boarding pass then you will not be authorized. Similarly, if
you try to take a business class seat when you only purchased an economy you will not
be authorized. Access control often goes together with authorization. Using access
control the resources can control things such as the time at which you are allowed to
access a resource. For example, an airport officer may only be allowed to work during
certain timings. Several models such as mandatory access control, discretionary access
control and role-based access control address the access control features such as mutual
exclusion, time constraints, separation of duties, and so on.
This chapter contains a description of the security in Grids, technologies and
authorization frameworks. As this research focuses on providing an access control
mechanism in Data Grids, access control requirements in Grids are covered in detail.
Outline of this chapter is as follows: Section 2.1 contains a description of the Globus
Toolkit which provides the basic components necessary for establishing a Grid. It also
describes the Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI), mutual authentication and single sign-on
features. Section 2.2 contains a description of the access control requirements in Grids.

2.1. Globus Toolkit
Globus Toolkit [18] provides a set of basic services to establish a Grid system.
The Globus Toolkit includes several widely used software components, shown in Figure
1, to provide security, data management, execution management, and information
8

services for establishing a Grid. These components use Web Services, which provide
flexible, extensible and widely adopted XML-based mechanisms for interface [22]. The
toolkit has recently been aligned with the Web Services Resource Framework (WSRF)
[29]. WSRF defines conventions for managing the state in distributed systems based on
Web services.

Authentication
Authorization

OGSA-DAI

Pre-WS
Authentication
Authorization
Credential
Management
Security

Grid FTP

Data
Management

Grid Resource
Allocation and
Management
(GRAM)

Pre-WS
GRAM
Management

Execution
Management

Web MDS

Monitoring
and Discovery
Service
(MDS)

Web Services
(WS)
Components

Non-WS
Components

Information
Services

Figure 1: Basic components of Globus Toolkit version 4
The security components protect communications between users/resources and
control the access to resources. They also provide message protection, delegation,
authorization and authentication. The data management components provide solutions for
reliable data transfer, data access and integration. The execution management
components provide services for the resource allocation and management. The
information services components support monitoring and discovery of resources through
the use of Web Services Notification and WSRF. For each of these components, a C
and/or Java Application Programming Interface (API) is available for developers [95].
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2.1.1. Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI)
The Toolkit contains OpenSSL, which is used to create an encrypted tunnel
between the clients and servers. The Toolkit offers the best-known security approach for
Grids. It provides authentication, authorization and secure communication through the
use of Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI). The major concepts of GSI are: a) to provide
single sign-on for multiple Grid systems and applications, b) to provide secure
communication between Grid systems and, c) to provide a security technology that can
be implemented across different organizations without maintaining a central managing
authority.
The GSI uses public key infrastructure (PKI) mechanisms which operate on
credentials issued to every Grid user and service. PKI enables the users to establish
confidentiality, message integrity and user authentication without having to exchange
any secret information in advance. The credentials formed by an X.509 certificate and
the associated public/private keys, are issued by a certificate authority (CA) trusted by all
entities in a Grid. The Globus Simple CA package provides a convenient method of
setting up a certificate authority that is interoperable with the Globus Toolkit. It
provides the means for the generation of certificate requests and the signing of
certificates [9]. It is capable of issuing certificates that can uniquely identify an
individual user or an organization. The X.509 certificate consists of the ‘subject’ which
is used to identify the certificate holder, the ‘issuer’ indicating the authority that has
issued this certificate, the time during which this certificate is ‘valid’, in addition to the
information pertaining to the public key of the user. The private key is held in a separate
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file which is a read-only to the user. An example X.509 certificate issued by Globus
simple CA is as shown in Figure 2.
Certificate:
Data:
Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number: 3 (0x3)
Signature Algorithm: md5WithRSAEncryption
Issuer: O=Grid, OU=GlobusTest, OU=simpleCA-focus.cs.wright.edu,
CN=Globus Simple CA
Validity
Not Before: Feb 16 19:38:13 2007 GMT
Not After : Feb 16 19:38:13 2008 GMT
Subject: O=Grid, OU=GlobusTest, OU=simpleCA-focus.cs.wright.edu,
OU=cs.wright.edu, CN=Vineela Muppavarapu
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
RSA Public Key: (1024 bit)
Modulus (1024 bit):
00:9c:50:05:da:19:9e:aa:7a:bc:54:43:29:4c:e0:
56:59:8e:41:3e:a9:35:88:a7:b5:13:84:1a:4c:82:
3b:33:14:2f:fb:48:4f:10:4d:e4:59:ec:ef:cc:c8:
e0:cc:4d:7c:7c:2d:e4:15:48:a4:16:5e:48:bb:ef:
1b:80:50:00:aa:e1:cc:cc:55:55:09:90:d2:b0:c5:
fc:8d:7b:ca:52:0b:5d:19:85:c3:69:fb:82:2e:e0:
7e:69:cd:09:99:a0:c5:60:54:5d:69:ff:e4:d6:3d:
b7:fa:48:ff:97:d9:11:7b:05:64:c1:70:c0:d6:1a:
a9:05:85:a0:32:18:75:74:93
Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
X509v3 extensions:
Netscape Cert Type:
SSL Client, SSL Server, S/MIME, Object Signing
Signature Algorithm: md5WithRSAEncryption
3e:cb:ae:04:a4:ed:12:ec:bd:03:6f:18:fc:8e:f1:7d:d0:72:
ea:49:10:88:d8:92:e4:54:9c:df:36:a3:f5:c6:43:83:3d:03:
35:0b:a8:df:8d:c8:ea:e4:c9:67:c2:87:a9:e8:68:36:0b:59:
17:26:59:9d:d7:62:0a:68:84:eb:cd:14:79:b8:be:7f:85:dd:
ab:79:4f:d2:7b:98:c8:45:1f:13:01:c9:f5:5c:4f:03:60:54:
24:61:75:35:3a:a6:45:8b:fc:d0:f2:a0:5f:57:ca:e9:0a:bd:
f1:c8:2f:b7:a0:6a:d6:29:e3:2b:b5:64:1d:54:7f:c2:e0:95:
9f:b2
Figure 2: X.509 certificate
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2.1.2. Mutual Authentication and Single Sign-on
Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI) uses the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol
for its certificate-based mutual authentication. Mutual Authentication is the process in
which two parties can authenticate each other based on the credentials issued by some
trusted third party, i.e., CA. Assume that there are two persons Alice and Bob are trying
to establish mutual authentication then the process can be described as follows:
1. Alice establishes a connection to Bob.
2. To start the authentication process Alice sends her certificate to Bob. The
certificate could be a standard X.509 certificate which contains the identity
(subject) of Alice, her public key, and the CA that issued the certificate.
3. Bob will now check the validity of the certificate by verifying the CA’s digital
signature and the authenticity of the public key.
4. Bob then generates a random message and sends it to Alice.
5. Alice encrypts the random message sent by Bob using her private key and
sends it back to Bob.
6. Bob decrypts the message using Alice’s public key which was sent earlier in
step 2. If the message is same as the message sent in step 4 then Bob knows
that it is indeed Alice.
7. Now that Bob trusts Alice. Alice also checks for the validity of Bob’s identity
by repeating the steps 2-6 with person Bob sending his certificate and Alice
sending the random message to Bob.

12

Figure 3 shows the use of proxy credential to support single sign-on in Data
Grids. GSI offers users a secure authentication option by creating a proxy credential
which is made up of a new public and private key pair and is signed by the user’s private
key. The proxy credential, issued by the end user not the CA, contains the user’s
‘subject’ with a slight change to show that it is a proxy credential. The proxy credential
is valid for a limited amount of time typically 12 hours. A user’s proxy credential has to
be created before contacting a Grid service. Once created, the proxy credential is used to
grant or deny access to resources found throughout the Data Grid. Because the proxy is
used across the system, this gives the end user the single sign-on capability.
The GSI handles user authorization by mapping the Grid user to a local user on
the system being accessed. In a GSI-enabled Grid, the system receiving the request
obtains the user’s identity from the proxy, and then accesses a local file to map that name
to a local user account. Thus, the Grid user does not need to have an individual account
on the system he/she is requesting to access because the permissions for the Grid user
would be same as those of the local user he/she is mapped to. By default, GSI provides
secure communication using digital certificates for mutual authentication and SSL/TLS
for data encryption.
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2.2. Issues to be Addressed While Specifying Access Control in
Data Grids
Controlling the user access to the datasets and managing the users and data
resources has become a crucial and prevalent issue for any distributed system. In Data
Grids, as users and data resources are distributed across organizations securing the access
to the data resources is becoming increasingly complex. In addition to authentication,
integrity, single sign-on, and delegation capabilities, there are certain other requirements
which have to be considered while specifying the access control for the Data Grid
resources as outlined below:
Interoperability: In distributed environments, such as Data Grids, any data resource in
the system can specify and enforce its own policy. There is no central policy and no
central authority for allowing access to the data resources. Users and data resources may
belong to multiple organizations with their own diverse security policies and
mechanisms. Participating organizations may have different security models. It is
important for these models to interoperate based on different levels of trust and contexts.
Trust should be established not only among users and data resources, but also among the
data resources themselves, so that they can be coordinated. These trust domains can span
across multiple organizations and must adapt dynamically as participants join or leave
and data resources are accessed or released [87]. Resource providers must understand and
support the mechanisms and policies that are not strictly under their control.
Scalability: Based on the parameters used, scalability can be classified into two types:
administrative scalability and performance scalability. For performance scalability, the
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number of users is a major parameter. The system should not be a bottleneck and should
scale even if the number of users increase significantly. For administrative scalability, the
management of access control policies should scale even if users are added or deleted
from the system. If the system is dynamic, administrative scalability is very critical [11].
In Data Grids, as users and data resources are dynamic, the permissions associated with
the users and data resources have to be updated depending on the changes in the
organization’s policy. Also, as users join/leave the organization the administrator has to
grant/refuse the necessary permissions. Considering the frequency of these changes and
the number of users, the authorization mechanism should be scalable with regard to both
performance and administration.
Privacy and Auditing: Privacy management and cross-domain auditing are significant
challenges in distributed environments [28]. An audit mechanism is responsible for
producing records which track security related events [45]. And, for this purpose, it is
essential to keep a log of the user access requests and the enforced security policies. The
user identity can be used to identify the user who initiated a request. The request can be
logged at the data resource along with the mapping information and the subsequent
actions performed. This information can be used to find patterns that fit the profile of a
system intrusion or the activities that do not fit the profiles of legitimate users [19].
However, this information could affect the privacy of users. For example, by examining
the information logged at various sites with respect to the users belonging to a particular
research group, it is possible to infer their data access patterns and thus obtain
information about their work.
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Principle of Least Privilege: Most systems do not enforce the Principle of Least
Privilege [92]. A user or an application must be delegated only those privileges required
for completing a certain set of tasks, otherwise the user/application should be totally
trusted to do no more than required. In today’s environment this is even more critical
since software can be regularly downloaded from remote sites. In addition to the
possibility of downloading malicious software such as Viruses, Trojans, Worms, and so
on, we cannot expect software to work exactly as specified because of bugs or malicious
intent. Any software with certain extra privileges has the potential to cause severe
damage to computer systems and data.
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3. ROLE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL
IN A DATA GRID USING STORAGE
RESOURCE BROKER AND
SHIBBOLETH
In this chapter, we describe our role-based access control (RBAC) system for
Data Grids using Storage Resource Broker and shibboleth. The Storage Resource Broker
(SRB) [5, 64] was developed by the San Diego Supercomputer Center (SDSC) as a
logical distributed file system based on client-server architecture. The SRB can be used
as a data grid management system as it has features to support the management,
collaboration, controlled sharing, publication, replication, transfer, attribute-based
organization, data discovery, and preservation of distributed data.
The SRB stores and manages the access control information of individual users in
the Metadata Catalog (MCAT) database. However, because of the specific MCAT
schema structure, this information can only be used by the SRB applications. If an
organization has many non-SRB applications, each with its own storage format for user

18

access control information, they cause substantial administration overhead because the
system administrator has to manage them independently. Thus, multiple updates may be
required if the access control information of a current user changes; and if new users are
allowed to access many data resources, it can create a scalability problem with regard to
administration. Additionally, as the access control information of each Grid user is
maintained in the MCAT database, if users join/leave the organizations frequently,
updating their access control information on an individual basis would be a difficult task.
Moreover, a user may not want to reveal his/her personal information; hence, privacy
protection becomes an important issue. The current identity-based access control
mechanisms do not protect the privacy of the users. In our research, we developed a new
access control mechanism which is not only scalable but also protecting the privacy of
users.
Role-based access control (RBAC) [16, 65, 70, 72] is an approach where
permissions are assigned to roles and roles are assigned to users, thereby acquiring the
roles’ permissions. Usually roles are created and assigned to users based on their job
functions, and RBAC is more scalable than identity-based authorization because
authorization information is associated with roles, not with individual users. In this paper,
we propose a new RBAC system for heterogeneous data resources in the SRB by using
Shibboleth [10] and the Object, Metadata and Artifacts Registry (OMAR) [53] as the
main components.
Shibboleth is an attribute authorization service and is designed to provide the user
attributes to the data resources for access control, and it mainly targets the internet-based
resources. Shibboleth supports the authentication of user at his/her home institution. By
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using Shibboleth, a user can either be authenticated at his/her home institution first and
then present his/her authentication information and attributes to a Data Grid service, or
contact a Data Grid service which is then redirected to the user’s home institution to
obtain the authentication information and attributes of the user. In either case, the user
does not need to be authenticated at each individual site, and the individual sites do not
need to maintain all the user information, as the authentication is handled by the user’s
home institution.
In Data Grids, users belonging to different organizations try to use the data
resources and applications. If the SRB server can recognize the credentials issued by the
user’s home institution, then the SRB server does not need to individually manage the
authentication information and attributes of each user. By using Shibboleth, the SRB
server just needs to negotiate with the user’s home institution regarding the security
policies and then trust the authority that issues the credentials of the user. The
authentication would then be handled by the user’s home institution, and the required
user information would be transferred to the SRB server. This approach would improve
the interoperability among organizations, facilitate their collaboration, and relieve the
SRB administrator from the burden of individually maintaining the authentication
information of the users. Also, by using Shibboleth, access control policies can be
specified based on the specific attributes of the user, such as role name and affiliation,
instead of the identity of the user.
Shibboleth issues user attributes in the form of Security Assertion Markup
Language (SAML) [47] assertion. In our access control system, this SAML assertion is
embedded into the user’s proxy credential. The SRB server can then obtain the SAML
20

assertion containing the role names of the user in addition to his/her identity or
distinguished name (DN) from the proxy credential. If a system wishes to perform
authentication using the individual identity or DN of the user, it can do so as the proxy
credential contains the DN of the user. In our system, Shibboleth is also used as a Role
Enablement Authority (REA), which is responsible for assigning roles to users and for
activating roles within the user’s session [48].
We used the Core and Hierarchical RBAC profile of the eXtensible Access
Control Markup Language (XACML) [48] to specify the access control policies.
XACML is a standard of the Organization for the Advancement of Structured
Information Standards (OASIS) for describing the access control policies uniformly
across different security domains [49]. Our system is based on the Core and Hierarchical
components of the ANSI-RBAC [74], and the Core and Hierarchical RBAC profile of
XACML defines how they can be specified in XACML.
For the distributed storage and administration of XACML policies and the userrole assignments, we used the OMAR. OMAR is an open-source implementation from
the freebXML.org, and it provides an implementation of the OASIS e-business
eXtensible Markup Language (ebXML) registry specifications [46]. A registry is an
information system that securely manages any content type and the standardized
metadata that describes the content. The ebXML registry specifications are developed to
achieve interoperable registries and repositories with an interface that enables
submission, query and retrieval [46].
Our system is scalable in terms of the number of access requests as well as the
number of users; and it is robust as there is no single point of failure. It supports the
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management of privileges and fine-grain attribute release policy; and it provides privacy
protection for users. It can support a wide range of security policies using role-privileges,
role hierarchies, and timing constraints. The MCAT database needs to maintain only the
mapping information from Grid user roles to local roles and local policies, thus their
administration overhead is reduced. When users join/leave, the MCAT administrator does
not have to bother about individually adding/removing their information in the MCAT
database, because OMAR can be used to directly grant/revoke the users’ memberships on
the roles.
We implemented our proposed RBAC system and analyzed its performance. A
Shibboleth interface program (SIP) has been designed to obtain the user’s attributes from
the Shibboleth service and to create the user’s Shibboleth proxy credential. The SRB
client has been modified to send the user’s Shibboleth proxy credential to the SRB server,
instead of the proxy credential. The SRB server has been modified to obtain the user’s
attributes from the user’s Shibboleth proxy credential and then to map the user’s VO role
to a local role by using the corresponding information in the MCAT database. Our
performance analysis shows that the proposed system incurs a small overhead in setting
up the security between the client and server. This overhead is quite acceptable when we
consider the benefits of our system, such as scalability in managing access control
policies and reduced administration overhead for the resource providers.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.1 contains background information
on SRB, RBAC and Shibboleth. It also describes the problems with the existing access
control in SRB. Section 3.2 contains some related work on access control. Section 3.3
contains a description of our proposed RBAC system with Shibboleth and XACML for
22

SRB. Section 3.4 contains the implementation details and describes the changes we made
on the client-side as well as the server-side. Section 3.5 contains the performance details
with some graphs showing the effects of the changes made. Section 3.6 contains some
conclusions.

3.1. Background
3.1.1. Storage Resource Broker (SRB)
The Storage Resource Broker (SRB) is developed as a client-server middleware
that provides uniform interface to access heterogeneous distributed storage resources
including file systems, database systems and archival storage systems [5]. The SRB
presents the user with a single file hierarchy for the data distributed across multiple
storage systems. The SRB provides the following: (1) a logical namespace to describe
storage systems, digital file objects and collections; (2) specific features for digital
libraries, persistent archive systems and collection management systems; (3) capabilities
for storing replicas of data, authenticating users, controlling access to documents and
collections, and auditing accesses; (4) user-defined metadata management at the
collection level and object level, and search capabilities based on the metadata [63].
SRB is a comprehensive distributed data management solution and has features to
support the management and collaborative (and controlled) sharing, publication,
replication, transfer, and preservation of distributed data collections. The SRB also serves
as a middleware via a rich set of APIs available to higher-level applications.
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SRB, in conjunction with the Metadata Catalog (MCAT) database, supports
location transparency by providing access to data resources based on their attributes
rather than their names or physical locations. The MCAT database contains file attributes,
metadata, user information, security and access control information, and also maintains
audit trail on data and collections of data. The architecture, entities and the attributes of
MCAT database are described in [41].
SRB enables easy access across a variety of storage devices and provides
improved discovery, access and management of data files. Users and administrators
benefit from an enterprise-wide, transparent view of all data. SRB uses the Metadata
Catalog (MCAT) and provides access to data resources based on their attributes rather
than their names or physical locations. The MCAT server uses a database to store the
system and dataset metadata. Metadata includes the physical and logical details of the
data held and its replicas, user information, security and access control information.
The MCAT is used to determine where a given data object is physically located,
and which drivers handle and access the data of interest. Furthermore, the MCAT
contains all file attributes, metadata, access control lists (ACLs), storage resource
information, and user data, and also handles queries.

3.1.1.1. The SRB Architecture
The SRB system is a distributed system comprised of three major components,
MCAT database, SRB server and SRB client. The architecture of the SRB system is as
shown in Figure 4. Usually the SRB system consists of a single MCAT database and one
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or more SRB Servers and Clients. If the SRB server is directly linked to the MCAT
database then it is referred as MCAT-enabled SRB server (MES server) otherwise it is
called a non-MCAT-enabled SRB server (non-MES server). The advantage of MCAT
architecture is that users can transparently access data no matter where the data objects
are located or what hardware or software they are stored on.

Client
MCAT
Database

Client

SRB Clients

Network

Server

Server

Server

SRB Servers

Storage Systems
(database systems, file
systems, archival
storage systems, etc.)
Figure 4: SRB system architecture overview

Two or more independent SRB systems can interact with each other and allow for
access to the data and metadata. These systems are called zones or federated MCAT
system. Each of the SRB system maintains its own MCAT to store all the metadata
information, corresponding to that zone. However, in case of federated MCAT system,
this information has to be updated frequently across the other zones’ MCAT enabled
Servers (MESs) to avoid any inconsistencies in the metadata and access control
information stored in the MCAT. Thus, all the MCATs in the federation would be
maintaining the same information and even if the local MCAT fails the information can
be accessed from the other zones’ MCAT database.
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SRB provides command line utilities, called Scommands, for interacting with the
SRB server. Scommands are the Unix-like commands in which most of the command
names are preceded by S. These are Unix-like commands for accessing SRB data and
metadata. For example, the command Sls works similar to the way ls command works on
a Unix machine.

3.1.1.2. Security and Access Control in SRB
SRB supports two types of authentication: the ENCRYPT1, which is a passwordbased authentication system, and the Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI). The user
passwords for ENCRYPT1 and the distinguished names (DNs) for GSI are stored in the
MCAT database. The following is a brief description of how the security in SRB system
works. The client application contacts the SRB server and requests the data or a set of
tasks to be performed on the data. The server then contacts the MCAT enabled server
(MES) to see if the request is from an authenticated user. The MES checks the MCAT
database and authenticates the user based on the user’s identity. Once the user is
authenticated, the user is allowed to see all the metadata he/she is authorized to see. The
user can only see the metadata describing the data objects which he/she can access. The
tasks requested by the user would then be performed if the user has the permission to
access the data sets.
SRB supports two types of access control: a) Unix-type access permissions that
allow read, write and all access permissions to be set on a dataset or collections of data. It
is also possible to allow/deny access to as many groups and users as needed. b) A
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ticketing system, in which, tickets are issued by owners of dataset to other users, groups
of users and everyone. Owners of the data objects can specify which users and user
groups can have what permissions (read, write, etc.) on their data objects. For all the data
objects exposed by an SRB server, permissions assigned to an individual user/user group
should be stored in the MCAT database. If the privileges of a user change in an
organization, the corresponding information should be updated in the MCAT database.
The ticket mechanism, supported by SRB, is a restricted form of read privilege
[6]. The user with the privilege of granting a ticket on a data object can create tickets and
issue them to other users. This ticket could be valid for a specific period of time or for a
certain number of uses, thus the read access to a data object can be controlled. This ticket
mechanism can only control read accesses, thus it limits the delegation of access
privileges. Furthermore, the current access control system of the SRB is not scalable in a
Data Grid environment, especially if the resource providers and users belong to multiple
organizations, because it would be very difficult to manage the access control
information for individual users as well as their tickets. Most of all, the access control
information stored in the MCAT database cannot be used by non-SRB applications.

3.1.2. Role-Based Access Control
In role-based access control model, roles are associated with permissions and
users are assigned roles thereby users acquire the roles’ permissions. Since RBAC was
proposed it has been used extensively in scientific as well as business communities.
Supporting role-based access control (RBAC) [16, 70] is desirable in Data Grids. RBAC
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shows clear advantages over traditional discretionary and mandatory access control
models in such environments, because it allows a uniform representation of diverse
security policies [33]. However, additional actions should be taken to make sure that
inter-domain violations do not occur.
In RBAC, permissions are associated with roles, and users are assigned
appropriate roles, thereby acquiring the roles’ permissions [65]. In a VO with a large
number of users, we could think of several groups of users, each with different levels of
access (roles). A role has certain privileges associated with it. When a VO role is mapped
to a local role, it will specify the privileges a user can have; for example, access to a
specific table of a database.
In VOs, users may be assigned specific tasks, and there may be constraints related
to the execution of those tasks. For example, a user may have access to data only during
certain days of the week, or certain tasks may be considered mutually exclusive for a
user; i.e., any two or more tasks cannot be executed at the same time. RBAC can support
a wide range of security policies using role-privileges, role hierarchies, and constraints.
The typical identity-based authorization used today is not scalable because
authorization information should be maintained for each user. In RBAC, authorization
information is associated with roles, not with individual users. It has been shown that the
cost of administering RBAC is proportional to U+P per role, where U is the number of
individuals in a role and P is the number of permissions required by the role, while the
cost of associating users directly with permissions is proportional to U×P [17, 93].
In certain instances, a user may wish to delegate only a subset of its rights to an
application to act on its behalf. This requirement can usually arise in systems where a
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limited trust relationship is established between entities. For example, a user may contact
a data mining service to mine certain data sets that the user has access to. If the trust
between the user and the service is limited, then the user may want to delegate only a
specific subset of its rights to the service, thus enabling it to complete only the required
task and nothing more. With RBAC, such delegation could be done easily. For example,
a user in a special role can delegate privileges to other roles.
RBAC is distinguished by its inherent support for the Principle of Least Privilege
[40], which requires that a user be given no more privileges than necessary to perform a
job [16]. It can be easily enforced by first identifying the roles in an organization
correctly and then assigning only those privileges to each role that allow the role
members to perform their tasks. Users can request a particular role among those they are
entitled to and, hence, gain the specific permissions tied with that role. Furthermore,
current RBAC models are modular and can thus incorporate sophisticated functionality
such as RBAC policy administration. Also, more complex forms of access control, such
as task-based access control (TBAC), can be layered on RBAC [70].

3.1.3. Shibboleth
Shibboleth [10] is an attribute authorization service, developed by the Internet2
community for cross-organization identity federation [88]. Shibboleth creates a
distributed authorization infrastructure for web resources, and simplifies access control
policies and their management [4]. It enables anonymous interaction between users, thus
protecting individual privacy while still providing basic security for resource providers
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[88]. The Shibboleth service maps a user name and attributes onto a unique identifying
handle. To protect the user’s privacy, the service can restrict the information about the
holder of the handle depending on who is asking for the information. For example, it does
not release the user’s name except to those requestors who have been authorized [28].
A target Data Grid service authenticates a user by using GSI, determines the
address of the appropriate Shibboleth attribute service in the process, and then obtains the
selected user attributes, that the Data Grid service is authorized to see, from the
Shibboleth service. These attributes are presented to the requested service by using
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) [47] attribute statements. The attributes
thus obtained will then be used by the Data Grid service in making authorization
decisions. These attributes will be passed securely through a trust relationship to the Data
Grid service. To provide anonymity in the Data Grid context, users are issued a set of
credentials with pseudonym identifiers, and they will have the option of releasing only a
subset of their attributes to particular resources. For example, identifying information
about the user does not need to be released.

3.1.4. eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML)
XACML is an OASIS standard for describing access control policies uniformly
across different security domains [49]. XACML defines an access control framework as
shown in Figure 5. The framework consists of a Policy Administration Point (PAP),
Policy Information Point (PIP), a Policy Decision Point (PDP) and a Policy Enforcement
Point (PEP). The basic functionality of these components is as follows: A PIP releases
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attribute values related to the subject (such as a user, application), the resource and the
environment. A PDP makes an authorization decision based on the attributes released by
the PIP and the policy maintained by the PAP. PEP executes the decision of the PDP by
either performing or denying the client’s request.
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Figure 5: XACML authorization model
The data flow in the XACML authorization model, shown in Figure 5, can be
described as follows: A PEP receives the access requests from the user and forwards
them to the PDP. The PDP retrieves the policy from the PAP and sends an attribute query
to the PIP requesting the attributes of the user. The PIP then obtains the user attributes
from the policy database or file and sends the attributes back to the PDP in the form of an
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attribute statement. The PDP then compares the policy retrieved from the PAP with the
attributes released by the PIP and makes a decision either “permit” or “deny” and sends it
to the PEP. The PEP receives the decision from the PDP and enforces the decision either
by granting the access request of the user or by denying the request.
XACML also defines a policy language with the following main components to
represent the policies:
(1) A <PolicySet> contains a set of policies or other policy sets.
(2) A <Policy> represents an access control policy described through a set of
rules.
(3) A <Rule> represents an access rule or permission.
An XACML <PolicySet>, <Policy> or <Rule> may contain a <Target> element.
A <Target> element specifies the set of subjects, resources, actions and environments to
which the <PolicySet>, <Policy> or <Rule> applies [49]. The Core and Hierarchical
RBAC profile of XACML specification defines how core and hierarchical RBAC defined
in [74] can be specified in XACML. The Core and hierarchical profile further defines the
following components:
(1) Permission <PolicySet> or PPS contains <Policy> elements and <Rules>
associated with a given role. A Permission <PolicySet> may also contain
references to other Permission <PolicySet>s associated with other roles that are
junior to the given role, thereby allowing the role to inherit all the permissions
associated with the junior roles. The <Policy> elements and <Rules> of the PPS
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describe the resources and the permissions on the resources, along with any
conditions on those permissions.
(2) Role <PolicySet> or RPS associates a role with the corresponding PPS. Each
RPS can only refer to a single PPS.
(3) Role Assignment <Policy> or <PolicySet> defines which roles can be enabled
or assigned to which subjects.

3.2. Related Work
We use the Shibboleth Identity Provider (IdP) to support RBAC in SRB, as
described later in Section 3.4. Shibboleth has certain advantages, such as privacy
protection, over other authorization services for Grids, such as the Community
Authorization Service (CAS) [58], Virtual Organization Management Service (VOMS)
[1], Akenti [82] and PERMIS [54].
CAS provides a scalable mechanism for specifying and enforcing complex and
dynamic policies that govern the access to Grid resources. CAS allows resource providers
to delegate some of the authority for maintaining fine-grain access control policies to
communities. CAS issues authorization assertions containing the list of actions the user is
allowed to perform on a resource. However, CAS being a centralized authorization
system proves to be a bottleneck.
VOMS supports user-role assignments and provides attribute certificates,
containing user’s VO roles and group memberships, to the users. The attribute certificates
do not provide rights directly, and they need to be interpreted by the resource. As far as
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Akenti is concerned, it is targeted on authorizing accesses to web resources and
particularly websites, so it is not adequate for VOs [1]. Akenti does not provide support
for dynamic delegation [82]. Delegation is a key issue in a VO, wherein a set of rights
can be delegated to a program for it to act on behalf of a user. A program should also be
able to delegate some of its rights to other programs [20].
PERMIS [54] is an attribute-based authorization service, and so is VOMS. They
use assertions that bind the attributes to users for authorization, as opposed to the typical
identity-based authorization used today [24]. However, currently they do not support any
standard for how attributes are transferred from the attribute authority to the Grid services
and no standard is used for expressing the policy regarding those attributes [24].

3.3. An RBAC System with Shibboleth for the SRB
In this section, we propose a new RBAC system using Shibboleth for the SRB
system. The Core and Hierarchical RBAC profile of the eXtensible Access Control
Markup Language (XACML) [48] is used to specify the access control policies. For the
distributed storage and administration of XACML policies, including user-role
assignments, we used the Object, Metadata and Artifacts Registry (OMAR).

3.3.1. Drawbacks of the Existing Access Control Method in the SRB
The SRB server authenticates the user based on his/her individual identity. Upon
successful authentication, the SRB server checks whether that identity is authorized to
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perform the requested action, such as accessing a file, creating a new file/directory, etc.
However, this method is not suitable when the number of users is large in a SRB system,
because the MCAT database server could become a bottleneck. Moreover, when a local
security policy is changed, it may require the MCAT database to be updated.
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Students
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Figure 6: Scenario describing the problem with current implementation

To illustrate this access control problem in a SRB system, let us consider the
following example: Suppose that a university created a Data Grid by installing an MCAT
database and an SRB server at the university level. For simplicity, assume that the Wright
State University establishes a Data Grid by installing an MCAT database and an MCAT
enabled server at the university level. For simplicity, let us further assume that it has two
sets of data, one of which can be accessed by the graduate students and faculty of the
Computer Science and Engineering (CSE) department and the other dataset can be
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accessed by the graduate students and faculty from the business school. These datasets
may also be accessed by students and faculty from other departments.
With the current implementation, the MCAT database administrator will have to
manually enter all the identities (for example, the ‘subject’) of the graduate students and
faculty from the CSE department as well as those from the business school to allow the
access to the corresponding data resources. If any student/faculty joins/leaves/changes the
department his/her identity (‘subject’) has to be added/deleted/updated in the MCAT
database. Considering the frequency of those personnel changes the MCAT database
server has to be updated quite often, and it increases the burden on the administrator. If
the university decides to collaborate with other universities to form a larger Data Grid,
the administration overhead would increase multiple folds.
For improving the scalability of the SRB system a federated system or Zone SRB
has been proposed. In a federated system each server maintains its own MCAT database.
A zone can have a single MCAT database. All the zones (MCAT databases) may be
federated and the data may be replicated depending on the requirements. Certain zones
may wish to share its data while certain zones might share the access control information
of the users. This solution reduces the latency of the requests and also seeks to address
the bottleneck problem. However, an additional database has to be administered and
managed which might not be an ideal solution in many cases. Also, the access control
information stored in this database may not be usable to other applications. There is no
support for leveraging the existing security infrastructure.
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3.3.2. Our Proposed RBAC with Shibboleth
Our proposed system uses the VO roles of the Grid users instead of their
identities. By using the VO roles, the university server only needs to maintain few roles
instead of all the user identities. This also reduces the administration overhead for the
MCAT administrator as he/she does not have to worry about individually adding or
removing the user identities from the database.
In our system, Shibboleth maintains the security policies of the VOs, grants the
users’ memberships on VO roles, and then authorizes them to use the privileges of those
roles. The data resource providers only need to maintain the mapping information from
the VO roles to the local roles and local policies, thereby reducing the number of entries
to be maintained in the MCAT database dramatically. Our system also allows the
specification of policies at the VO level, thus if the users do not possess the required
privileges, their access can be denied at the VO level. This eliminates unnecessary
authentication, mapping and connection overheads on the resource providers. When users
join/leave the VO, Shibboleth can just grant/revoke their memberships on the VO roles.
Our system architecture is shown in Figure 7. Shibboleth releases the attribute
values related to the user. The SRB server obtains the user attributes released by
Shibboleth, and then makes an authorization decision based on the user attributes and the
corresponding resource policy information. Based on its decision, the SRB server either
performs or denies the client’s request.
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Figure 7: Proposed architecture

The data flow in our system is described in detail as follows:
1. The client sends an attribute query (as a SAML request) to Shibboleth.
2. To obtain the user information, Shibboleth queries the OMAR registry, which stores
the user-role assignments and the access control policies in XACML.
3. The user attributes are returned from the OMAR registry.
4. Shibboleth sends the SAML response containing the user attributes to the client.
5. The client makes an access request to the SRB server along with the user attributes.
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6. The SRB server obtains the user attributes from the client, and then queries the
MCAT database to obtain the corresponding resource policy information, including
the mapping of the VO role to local roles and their access permissions.
7. The MCAT database returns the resource policy information to the SRB server.
8. If the resource policy allows the access, then the client request is performed by the
SRB server, otherwise it is denied.
Our system works in the push model, as the user can directly obtain the
permissions from the authorization service and then pass them to the SRB server at the
time of making a request. The SRB server then verifies the authenticity of the user and
authorizes the user based on the permissions obtained, provided the authority that issued
them is trustworthy. An advantage of the push model is that it allows the user to
explicitly select a role from the set of roles he/she is entitled to. Additionally, the push
model is inherently scalable because the SRB server does not need to contact the
authorization service to obtain the user attributes for each access request. In case that the
user and the authorization service belong to the same organization and are protected by a
firewall, the push model should be deployed because the SRB server may not be able to
contact the authorization service directly.
Shibboleth also supports the pull model, where the user directly contacts the SRB
server first. The SRB server then contacts Shibboleth to obtain the user’s permissions. An
advantage of the pull model is that it can be deployed easily because users do not need to
interact with the authorization service [88]. However, considering the advantages of the
push model, our system is currently deployed in the push model alone.
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In traditional systems, an organization’s entire security policy is managed by a
single central authority; however, in a VO, its security policy is distributed across its
member organizations. Thus, it may be necessary to manage the user attributes across
different organizations and to aggregate them for an authorization decision. Shibboleth
allows the VO to manage different subsets of its attribute space at different member
organizations, as each member organization operates a Shibboleth service. In addition,
the local access control policies of each organization can be managed by OMAR, which
also allows the federation of the local access control policies of different organizations.
Thus, distributed administration of the access control policies of a VO is feasible, while
maintaining the local autonomy of each member organization. This also ensures the
privacy of users, as the individual user information is solely administered at the user’s
home organization.

3.3.3. Specification of RBAC Policies Using XACML
The specification of RBAC policies for the VO roles can be done by the VO
administrator using the XACML policy language. A single policy can include any
number of decentralized rules, each managed by different organizations [38]. In multidomain environments such as VOs, it is necessary to distinguish the user attributes in a
VO from the user attributes in other VOs. For example, the employee role in the
Accounting subgroup of the VO Alpha may have different permissions from the
employee role in the Accounting subgroup of another VO Beta. Hence, when making an
authorization decision, it is important to know not only the role name employee but also
the VO name, either Alpha or Beta.
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In order to manage and identify the attributes from different domains, Shibboleth
uses scoped attributes, defined in SAML, which can include the domain name. A scoped
attribute is a combination of a value and its scope. The scope identifies the domains and
sub-domains in which the values are defined. An example scoped attribute is
“faculty@abcuniv.edu”, which identifies the value “faculty” in the scope “abcuniv.edu”.
However, the XACML profile does not support the scoped attribute values for subjects
such as roles. Mapping SAML to XACML allows the systems using XACML to store
SAML attributes [51].
<PolicySet xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:policy:schema:os"
PolicySetId="RPS:employee:role" PolicyCombiningAlgId="&policycombine;permit-overrides">
<Target>
<Subjects>
<Subject>
<SubjectMatch MatchId="&function;anyURI-equal">
<AttributeValue DataType="&xml;anyURI"
>&roles;employee</AttributeValue>
<SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="&role;"
DataType="&xml;anyURI"/>
</SubjectMatch>
</Subject>
</Subjects>
</Target>
<PolicySetIdReference>PPS:employee:role</PolicySetIdReference>
</PolicySet>
Figure 8: RPS of employee role
The RPS of the employee role, shown in Figure 8, references the PPS of the
employee role via <PolicySetIdReference>. The PPS of the employee role is shown in
Figure 9. The RPS of the manager role is not shown here, but is similar to the RPS of
employee, except that the role name is manager and the <PolicySetIdReference>
references PPS:manager:role shown in Figure 10.
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<PolicySet xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:policy:schema:os"
PolicySetId="PPS:employee:role"
PolicyCombiningAlgId="&policy-combine;permit-overrides">
<Policy PolicyId="Permissions:specifically:for:the:employee:role"
RuleCombiningAlgId="&rule-combine;permit-overrides">
<Rule RuleId="Permission:to:read:data:from:DataSet1" Effect="Permit">
<Target>
<Resources> <Resource>
<ResourceMatch MatchId="&function;string-equal">
<AttributeValue DataType="&xml;string">DataSet1</AttributeValue>
<ResourceAttributeDesignator AttributeId="&resource;resource-id"
DataType="&xml;string"/>
</ResourceMatch>
</Resource> </Resources>
<Actions> <Action>
<ActionMatch MatchId="&function;string-equal">
<AttributeValue DataType="&xml;string">read</AttributeValue>
<ActionAttributeDesignator AttributeId="&action;action-id"
DataType="&xml;string"/>
</ActionMatch>
</Action> </Actions>
</Target>
<Condition>
<Apply FunctionId="&function;and">
<Apply FunctionId="&function;time-greater-than-or-equal">
<Apply FunctionId="&function;time-one-and-only">
<EnvironmentAttributeDesignator
AttributeId="&environment;current-time" DataType="&xml;time"/>
</Apply>
<AttributeValue DataType="&xml;time">9h</AttributeValue>
</Apply>
<Apply FunctionId="&function;time-less-than-or-equal">
<Apply FunctionId="&function;time-one-and-only">
<EnvironmentAttributeDesignator AttributeId="&environment;currenttime" DataType="&xml;time"/>
</Apply>
<AttributeValue DataType="&xml;time">17h</AttributeValue>
</Apply>
</Apply>
</Condition>
</Rule>
</Policy>
</PolicySet>
Figure 9: PPS of employee role
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<PolicySet xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:policy:schema:os"
PolicySetId="PPS:manager:role"
PolicyCombiningAlgId="&policy-combine;permit-overrides">
<Policy PolicyId="Permissions:specifically:for:the:manager:role"
RuleCombiningAlgId="&rule-combine;permit-overrides">
<Rule RuleId="Permission:to:write:data:to:DataSet1" Effect="Permit">
<Target>
<Resources>
<Resource>
<ResourceMatch MatchId="&function;string-equal">
<AttributeValue
DataType="&xml;string">DataSet1</AttributeValue>
<ResourceAttributeDesignator AttributeId="&resource;resource-id"
DataType="&xml;string"/>
</ResourceMatch>
</Resource>
</Resources>
<Actions>
<Action>
<ActionMatch MatchId="&function;string-equal">
<AttributeValue
DataType="&xml;string">write</AttributeValue>
<ActionAttributeDesignator AttributeId="&action;action-id"
DataType="&xml;string"/>
</ActionMatch>
</Action>
<Actions>
</Target>
</Rule>
</Policy>
<PolicySetIdReference>PPS:employee:role</PolicySetIdReference>
</PolicySet>
.
Figure
10: PPS of manager role
A policy could contain the individual permissions and timing constraint
information of a role, indicating that the user in that role can access a resource during a
specific time period. In [34], the authors introduced a specification of the periodicity and
duration constraints in RBAC. Our system can use this specification, and the timing
constraints can be represented in the XACML policy by using the Environment attributes.
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For example, Figure 9 contains the periodicity of the time duration between 9:00 AM and
5:00 PM each day. The PPS of the employee role grants the permission to execute the
read operation (specified within <Action>) on the resource ‘DataSet1’ (specified within
<Resource>) only from 9:00 AM to 5:00 PM (specified within <Condition>). The PPS of
the manager role, shown in Figure 10, grants the permission to execute the write
operation on ‘DataSet1’. It references the PPS of the employee role via
<PolicySetIdReference>, thereby inherits all the permissions of the employee role.

3.3.4. Object, Metadata and Artifacts Registry (OMAR)
For the storage and management of the XACML policies and the user-role
assignments, we used the Object, Metadata and Artifacts Registry (OMAR) [53] which
provides an implementation of the OASIS ebXML registry specifications. The ebXML
specifications are developed to achieve interoperable registries and repositories, with an
interface that enables submission, query and retrieval of the registry and repository
contents [46]. An ebXML registry is an information system that securely manages any
content type and the standardized metadata that describes the content. It also provides a
set of services for sharing of its content and metadata between organizations in a
federated environment [50].
OMAR stores data in a repository and stores the associated metadata as registry
objects [50]. The relationship between registry objects is represented by an association
object. OMAR allows many-to-many associations between registry objects. OMAR uses
an object, called slot, to add attributes dynamically to registry objects.
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3.3.5. Administration of the RBAC Policies in XACML by Using OMAR
The XACML role policy information of individual users can be managed by the
OMAR. OMAR stores the XACML policies in their entirety as repository items in a
relational database and classifies them as either XACML Policy object or XACML
PolicySet object. However, as policies are stored in their entirety, any updates in policies
become difficult especially for VOs whose policies are complex and tend to change
dynamically. To solve this problem, we propose to split each policy into components and
store them as different objects, as shown in Figure 11.
OMAR supports the federation of registries by defining a federation object and by
creating an association between the registry objects and the federation object. Federation
allows multiple registries to link together seamlessly and appear as a single logical
registry, while retaining local autonomy and security. Thus, XACML-based policies can
be stored and managed across multiple sites in the Data Grid, while each site maintains
its own registry and Shibboleth service. Hence, there is less chance to have a bottleneck,
and there is no single point of failure in the system as attribute queries are distributed
among the Shibboleth services.
One of the key features of RBAC is the ability to manage itself through
administrative roles and permissions [71]. Users in administrative roles can create roles
and role hierarchies; make user-role and permission-role assignments; and specify
constraints. Furthermore, they can grant administration privileges to other users. This
administration feature of RBAC is not directly addressed by the RBAC profile of
XACML, but can be easily realized through OMAR.
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<PolicySet xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:policy:schema:os" PolicySetId="PPS:employee:role"
PolicyCombiningAlgId="&policy-combine;permit-overrides">
<Policy PolicyId="Permissions:specifically:for:the:employee:role" RuleCombiningAlgId="&rulecombine;permit-overrides">
<Rule RuleId="Permission:to:perform:read:on:DataSet1" Effect="Permit">
<Target>
<Resources>….DataSet1… </Resources>
<Actions>…read… </Actions>
</Target>
</Rule>
</Policy>
</PolicySet>

RPS

Id:1253123
ObjectType: PolicySet
Name:PPS:employee:role
Slots:
Name: PolicyCombiningAlgId
Value: &policy-combine;permit-overrides

Id: 256
ObjectType: Association
AssociationType:Contains

Id: 2398474
ObjectType: Policy
Name:
Permissions:specifically:for:the:employee:role
Slots:
Name: RuleCombiningAlgId
Value: &rule-combine;permit-overrides

Id:2837429
ObjectType: Rule
Name:Permission:to:perform:read:on:DataSet1
Slots:
Name: Effect
Value: permit
Id:5675677
ObjectType: Target
Id: 3256444
ObjectType: Resources

Id: 456
ObjectType: Association
AssociationType:Contains

Id:789
ObjectType: Association
AssociationType: Contains

Id: 4356575
ObjectType: String
Name: DataSet1

Id: 565
ObjectType: Association
AssociationType:Contains

Id: 878
ObjectType: Association
AssociationType: Contains
Id: 3256444
ObjectType: Actions
Id: 4565675
ObjectType: String
Name: read

Figure 11: A part of employee PPS and corresponding storage in OMAR
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A user with OMAR registry administration privileges can create policy objects
and determine how other registry users can access them through the Access Control
Policy (ACP) file. In particular, that user can create a registry role (by creating policy
objects) and assign the privilege of creating/accessing certain registry objects to that role.
A registry role is an OMAR component similar to a role related to a database. The user
who creates a registry role can also grant memberships on that registry role to other
registry users. For example, a VO administrator having OMAR registry administration
privileges can create a new registry role and assign (to that role) only the privilege of
creating users in VO employee role. The VO administrator can then assign a VO manager
to the new registry role (after creating a registry account for the VO manager). Then, the
VO manager can create new users in VO employee role by himself/herself.

3.4. Implementation Details
Our RBAC system with Shibboleth supports the push model, where the user
directly obtains his/her authorization information, in terms of VO roles, from Shibboleth
and passes them to the SRB server at the time of making a request. We have designed a
new program, called Shibboleth interface program (SIP), which can be invoked by the
user to obtain the authorization information from Shibboleth. This program creates a
Shibboleth proxy credential by including the authorization information into the user
proxy credential. The user proxy credential is formed by an X.509 certificate and the
associated public/private keys. The X.509 certificate is issued by a certificate authority
(CA) trusted by all entities in the Grid [8]. As the user proxy credential is valid for a
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limited period of time, 12 hours by default, so is the Shibboleth proxy credential. The
SRB client delegates the Shibboleth proxy credential to the SRB server to request an
access to a data resource. The SRB server-side has been extended to parse the user
attributes in the new Shibboleth proxy credential to obtain the VO role of the user.

3.4.1. Client-side Implementation
The SIP utilizes the Java GridShib SAML tools [73], capable of handling SAML attribute
requests and responses. As shown in Figure 12, the SIP invokes the SAML attribute
query client and passes the user proxy credential to it. The attribute query client then
contacts Shibboleth at the designated URL. Shibboleth retrieves the user’s attributes from
OMAR and returns them in the form of a SAML assertion to the SIP. The SIP also
utilizes the SAML X.509 binding tool to bind the SAML assertion as a non-critical
extension to the user proxy credential. The new credential is called Shibboleth proxy
credential.
1. User proxy
credential
Shibboleth
interface
program
(SIP)

6. Attribute
assertion

3. Attribute
query

2. Attribute
request
SAML attribute
query client

Shibboleth
5. Attribute
assertion

7. Attribute assertion and
user proxy credential

OMAR
4. User
attributes

SAML X.509
binding tool

8. Shibboleth proxy credential

Figure 12: Data flow involving the Shibboleth interface program (SIP)
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Certificate:
Data:
Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number: 867284 (0xd3bd4)
Signature Algorithm: md5WithRSAEncryption
Issuer: O=Grid, OU=GlobusTest, OU=simpleCA-xxxx.cs.wright.edu, OU=cs.wright.edu,
CN=uuuu, CN=613767748
Validity
Not Before: Apr 30 00:16:16 2008 GMT
Not After : Apr 30 12:21:16 2008 GMT
Subject: O=Grid, OU=GlobusTest, OU=simpleCA-xxxx.cs.wright.edu, OU=cs.wright.edu,
CN=uuuu, CN=613767748, CN=67935642
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
RSA Public Key: (512 bit)
Modulus (512 bit):
00:8d:cd:e0:1f:b9:57:dc:a9:3a:78:0a:4d:03:64:
2c:94:42:c6:ca:2f:33:b1:71:9f:49:1c:29:2d:73:
dd:8f:1e:10:5d:c0:ef:26:dc:ce:fc:18:9c:f9:60:
e4:11:5a:38:7d:76:63:ec:34:50:b0:e9:38:af:5f:
b0:21:a4:2c:a7

Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
X509v3 extensions:
1.3.6.1.4.1.3536.1.222: critical
0.0
..+.......
1.3.6.1.4.1.3536.1.1.1.10:
<Assertion xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:assertion"
xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:assertion"
xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:protocol"
xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchemainstance" AssertionID="_1063ef80756c76c747609152bbb4b567" IssueInstant="2008-0430T00:21:16.283Z" Issuer="https://idp.example.org/shibboleth" MajorVersion="1"
MinorVersion="1"><Conditions NotBefore="2008-04-30T00:21:16.283Z" NotOnOrAfter="2008-0430T00:51:16.283Z">
<AudienceRestrictionCondition><Audience>https://globus.org/gridshib</Audience><Audience>urn
:mace:gridshib:metadata:sp</Audience></AudienceRestrictionCondition></Conditions><AttributeS
tatement><Subject><NameIdentifier Format="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameidformat:X509SubjectName"
NameQualifier="https://idp.example.org/shibboleth">CN=uuuu,OU=cs.wright.edu,OU=simpleCAxxxx.cs.wright.edu,OU=GlobusTest,O=Grid</NameIdentifier></Subject>
<Attribute AttributeName="urn:mace:dir:attribute-def:role"
AttributeNamespace="urn:mace:shibboleth:1.0:attributeNamespace:uri">
<AttributeValue>manager</AttributeValue></Attribute>
<Attribute AttributeName="RolePermissions"
AttributeNamespace="urn:mace:shibboleth:1.0:attributeNamespace:uri">
<AttributeValue>Permission:1:Resource:DataSet1</AttributeValue><AttributeValue>Permission:1
:Action:read</AttributeValue>
<AttributeValue>Permission:2:Resource:DataSet2</AttributeValue><AttributeValue>Permission:2
:Resource:DataSet3</AttributeValue>
<AttributeValue>Permission:2:Action:read</AttributeValue>><AttributeValue>Permission:2:Actio
n:write</AttributeValue></Attribute>
</AttributeStatement></Assertion>
…

Figure 13: Example Shibboleth proxy credential
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Figure 13 shows an example Shibboleth proxy credential which contains a SAML
assertion issued by Shibboleth. The assertion, italicized in Figure 13, is valid for a limited
period of time specified by the Conditions statement in the assertion. The Shibboleth
proxy credential is stored as a default temporary file, which can be used by any Data Grid
applications, including the SRB client.

3.4.2. Server-side Implementation
The SRB server has been modified to obtain the VO role of the user from the
Shibboleth proxy credential. The SRB server parses the SAML assertions to obtain the
user role based on the algorithm shown in Figure 14.

Input: Shibboleth proxy credential of a user
Output: User role for accessing a resource
Method:
Get the delegated credential from the client
foreach certificate in the credential
Get the extension of the certificate
if non-critical extension exists then get the SAML assertions
foreach SAML assertion
parse the SAML assertion and obtain the attribute name, value and the
namespace
foreach attribute
if the attribute name refers to the user role
then return the attribute value representing the role name
else return the identity of the user

Figure 14: Extraction of the user role from the Shibboleth proxy credential

The SRB server tries to retrieve the user’s certificates from the credential
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presented. If a certificate exists, then the server tries to obtain the non-critical extension
containing the SAML assertions from it. The Object Identifier (OID) of that non-critical
extension is 1.3.6.1.4.1.3536.1.1.1.10. So, if a non-critical extension with that OID is
present, then the server obtains the SAML assertions present in it. From the SAML
assertions, the server obtains the attributes of the user, such as the user’s role name, and
uses them to perform the role-mapping (from a VO role to a local role) and to make all
the authorization decisions. If the server could not obtain the SAML assertions from the
credential, then it performs the matching between the user’s distinguished name (DN)
present in the certificate and the DN stored in the MCAT database.
Extended AID
Library
SRB
Server

AID
Library

GSS-API

Kerberos

DCE

X.509

Figure 15: Server-side modifications
Our server-side implementation, shown in Figure 15, extends the San Diego
Supercomputer Center (SDSC) Authentication/Integrity of Data (AID) library which
integrates the Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI) into the SRB system. The AID library
provides an API to the underlying Generic Security Services API (GSSAPI) package,
shielding the application programmer from the complexities of the GSSAPI. It also

51

supports Kerberos and the Distributed Computing Environment (DCE) security via
GSSAPI.

3.5. Performance Analysis
We implemented our proposed RBAC system and analyzed its performance in
terms of the overheads incurred. Our implementation is compared with the existing
implementation of SRB, which does not use Shibboleth for access control. For our
implementation, we installed an MCAT-enabled SRB (MES) server on a SuSE Linux
machine with a 2.6 GHz Intel Pentium IV processor and 1 GB RAM. SRB version 3.4.2
is used, and Oracle 9.0 is used to manage the MCAT database. To use the GSI, we
installed Globus Toolkit 4.0.2. To serve the user requests, a non-MES server is installed
on another SuSE Linux machine with a 1.6 GHz Intel dual-core processor and 2 GB
RAM. Shibboleth identity provider (IdP) 1.3c was configured to run on the SSL-enabled
Apache 2.2.0 and Tomcat 5.0.28 servers. We used OMAR 3.0 beta 1 as the repository for
storing the XACML policies. Our MES and non-MES servers are connected by a Fast
Ethernet LAN. For the purpose of analysis, the Sput command was invoked on the nonMES server, which is an SRB command line utility for importing a local file/directory at
a site into the SRB system.

3.5.1. Profiling Details
For profiling the time taken to receive the assertions from the Shibboleth server
and to embed them in the user credential a Java method System.currentTimeMillis() is
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used to get the current system time in milliseconds. Also, for the SRB system analysis, a
C time function gettimeofday() is used to get the time in the order of microseconds. For
more accuracy, the servers and containers were shutdown and restarted before each client
invocation of the Sput command, as well as before each invocation of the assertion
request to the Shibboleth server respectively, to minimize the caching effects.
The main changes are the way the server obtains the VO role from the client’s
delegated credential and the credential being delegated by the client. So only the GSI
security aspects of the client and the server are profiled and analyzed. SRB system
supports two GSI authentication settings, GSI authentication and GSI delegation. In case
of GSI delegation, the proxy credential of the user is delegated to the server and the
server may contact other services on user’s behalf. In case of GSI authentication, only the
user identity is used for establishing the connection. The extended AID library contains
the server side operations performed, such as extracting and parsing the credentials, when
the authentication mode is set to GSI delegation.
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100000
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1000
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1
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Figure 16: Total execution time for the Sput command
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The calls made to the original implementation of the SRB server using the user’s
proxy credential (referred to as Original in the figures) and the modified implementation
of the SRB server using the user’s Shibboleth proxy credential (referred to as Modified in
the figures), respectively, are profiled. In case of using the Shibboleth proxy credential,
an overhead for invoking the SIP is incurred. The SIP obtains the attributes of the user,
such as a VO role, in the form of an assertion from the Shibboleth, and then embeds the
assertion into the user’s proxy credential. The total time for this process is approximately
6 seconds, and the default life time of the user’s proxy credential is 12 hours. However,
this overhead is incurred only once before the requests are made by the user to the SRB
server, and the user can make any number of requests before the proxy credential expires.
The Sput command was executed to transfer the data files of different sizes from
our non-MES server to the MES server. Figure 16 shows the total times taken for 100
KB, 10 MB and 1 GB data files in the original and modified SRB implementations. We
can see that our RBAC system adds a very small overhead, compared to the total
execution time required by the original SRB implementation. And the overhead is
independent of the data file size. To analyze the overhead further, we profiled the security
functions on the client-side and server-side of the SRB system, and the results are
described in the following sections.
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3.5.2. Client-side Security
To analyze the overhead at the client side, the Sput command for transferring a
100 KB data file is used, and the execution times of the following functions of the AID
library are measured:
1. The aid_setup_creds function sets up the user’s proxy credential on the client-side.
2. The aid_establish_context_clientside function performs the mutual authentication
on the client-side.
The authentication mode is set to GSI delegation, and as shown in Figure 17, the
time for setting up the credentials and the time for establishing the context for mutual
authentication are almost the same in both implementations. The reason is because all the
security functions on the client-side remain unchanged in our modified implementation,
except for using the Shibboleth proxy credential instead of the user proxy credential.
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Figure 17: Security overheads on the client-side

3.5.3. Server-side Security
On the server-side, the authentication mode is also set to GSI delegation, and we
measured the execution times of the following functions:
1. The aid_setup_creds function sets up the server’s credential.
2.

The

aid_establish_context_serverside_with_delegate

performs

the

mutual

authentication on the server-side and extracts the user’s VO role or DN from the
Shibboleth proxy credential delegated to the server.
As shown in Figure 18, the execution time of the aid_setup_creds function remains
the

same

because

there

is

no

change

in

the

server

credential.

The

aid_establish_context_serverside_with_delegate function takes a little bit more time in
the modified implementation, because of the additional time for parsing the user
attributes in the Shibboleth proxy credential and extracting the VO role. However, the
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time difference is in the order of a few milliseconds, which is negligible compared to the
total time taken for a typical SRB application, like the Sput operation.
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Figure 18: Security overheads on the server-side
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Figure 19: Total time taken for the execution of the client program
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Figure 19 shows the total time taken for executing the Sls Command with the
following authentication settings: GSI authentication and GSI delegation. The Sls
command was executed with these settings on the original SRB implementation as well
as the modified SRB implementation. In case of GSI delegation, the time taken is even
higher because in addition to setting up the client’s credential there is an additional
overhead on the SRB server side. The overhead on the server side is because of the time
taken for extracting the SAML assertions from the client’s delegated credential and for
parsing the assertions to obtain the client’s role. In case of GSI authentication, the time
taken for the modified implementation is almost same as the original implementation as
there is no overhead involved for extracting client’s credentials.

3.6. Summary
We enhanced the access control mechanism of the SRB by using Shibboleth,
XACML, and OMAR to support role-based access control (RBAC) and the distributed
administration of the access control policies. The proposed RBAC system allows quick
and easy deployment, and provides privacy protection for the users. Furthermore, the
users can be dynamically granted memberships on the VO roles. The administration
overhead of the resource providers is reduced because the information about the VO roles
and their mapping to local roles is maintained in the MCAT database, so the resource
providers do not need to maintain the information about individual users and their access
privileges. The specification of access control policies at the VO level eliminates
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unnecessary authentication, mapping and connections by denying invalid requests at the
VO level.
As our RBAC system uses the push model, the SRB server does not need to
contact the attribute service to obtain the user information for each access request. So, it
is more efficient in terms of performance when we have a large number of user requests.
In Data Grids, as users and resources are dynamic, administrative scalability is also
critical. As users join/leave the organization, the administrator may have to update the
policies as well as the necessary permissions of individual users. Considering the
frequency of these changes, our RBAC system has good administrative scalability
because the administrator just needs to grant/revoke the role memberships of the users
when they join/leave the system.
Our performance analysis shows that the proposed RBAC system incurs a small
overhead for authorizing the user. However, this overhead is quite acceptable when we
consider the benefits of our system, such as the scalability in terms of the number of
users, reduced administration overhead of the resource providers, and the distributed
administration of the access control policies.

59

4. SEMANTIC-BASED ACCESS
CONTROL USING ONTOLOGY AND
XACML
Several improvements to the current OGSA-DAI’s access control method have
been proposed [60, 61]. In [60, 61], we described how the Community Authorization
Service (CAS) [58] can be used to RBAC in the OGSA-DAI framework. In [44, 94], we
described how Shibboleth [88] and eXtensible Access Control Markup Language
(XACML) [52] can be used for specifying the RBAC policies for distributed
administration. Shibboleth is an attribute authorization service and is designed to provide
user attributes to the resources for access control, and it mainly targets the Internet-based
resources [88]. XACML is a standard of the Organization for the Advancement of
Structured Information Standards (OASIS) for describing the access control policies
uniformly across different security domains [52]. We used the Core and Hierarchical
RBAC profile of XACML [52] to specify the access control policies for multiple VOs.
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However, all these approaches have two major problems. The first problem is that
different organizations may use different terminologies in describing their data resources
and user roles. For example, different agencies, such as FBI and CIA, might use different
terms to describe the same role: FBI may use the term agent, whereas CIA may use the
term field_agent. These agencies will fail to match the relevant information when a
specific term used in the request is different from those used in the data resources and
access control policies, despite having the same meaning [14]. The second problem is
that the access control policies should be specified for individual data resources. Thus,
the management of access control policies may not be scalable in terms of the number of
data resources.
To solve these two problems, we propose a new semantic-based access control
system using ontology and XACML policy. By using ontology, VOs can resolve the
differences in their terminologies, and access control policies can be specified based on
concepts, instead of individual data resources and users. For example, we can specify a
policy like “agent can read criminal DB,” instead of specifying similar policies for all
different types of data resources and users. Thus, access control decisions can be made
based on the semantics of the users and data resources, rather than just using the syntax
of the user’s requests and the corresponding access control policies.
Our system is scalable in terms of the number of data resources as well as users,
because they can be abstracted based on the concepts, and the access control policies can
be specified on the concepts, instead of the individual data resources and users. When
new data resources are added, they could be categorized into existing concepts
automatically, thus we can reduce the administration overhead.
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Our proposed access control system uses XACML to specify the RBAC policies
for the data resources hosted by OGSA-DAI. Each XACML policy specifies the actions
that can be performed by a VO role on certain resource. A user’s request is evaluated by
our access control system against the XACML policies based on the attributes of the user,
requested resource and action. Currently, there are no tools available for creating,
updating and managing XACML policies. We also developed an XACML policy
administration tool with those capabilities, and it can automatically generate XACML
policies by importing existing RBAC policies.
We implemented our system by modifying the OGSA-DAI server to obtain the
user’s attributes from the Shibboleth identity provider (IdP) and evaluate the user access
request by using the XACML policy and the ontology. We used World Wide Web
Consortium (W3C) standard Web Ontology Language (OWL) to represent the ontology
of the data resources and users.
Our performance analysis shows that the proposed system incurs a small overhead
for obtaining the semantic information and for evaluating the access request against the
XACML policy. This overhead is quite acceptable when we consider the benefits of our
system, such as scalability in managing the access control policies and reduced
administration overhead for the resource providers. Additionally, as the access requests
are evaluated before a connection is established to the resource, unauthorized requests
can be denied without establishing a connection to the resource.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.1 contains background
information. In Section 4.2, we describe the related work in semantic access control. In
Section 4.3, we present our proposed semantic-based access control system in OGSA62

DAI using Shibboleth, XACML and ontology. In Section 4.4, we describe the
implementation details of the system. In Section 4.5 we present the results of
performance analysis. Section 4.6 contains some conclusions.

4.1. Background
4.1.1. Open Grid Services Architecture - Data Access and Integration
(OGSA-DAI)
OGSA-DAI is a widely used middleware infrastructure that facilitates uniform
access to data resources using a service-oriented architecture (SOA) [3]. Recently,
OGSA-DAI has been linked with the Web Services Resource Framework (WSRF). The
newly defined OGSA-DAI data service can be dynamically configured and can expose
multiple data resources, each of which can be any entity that acts as a source and/or a
sink of data [3]. The OGSA-DAI data service provides activities that a client can use to
perform data resource manipulation, data transformation and delivery actions on data
resources such as relational databases, XML databases, files, etc. The user can specify the
operations he/she wishes to perform on a resource in an XML document, called the
perform document.
OGSA-DAI uses the Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI) for authentication and
secure communication. GSI authenticates the user by using his/her proxy credential,
which is generated based on the user certificate and is valid for a certain time period (e.g.,
12 hours by default). Once the authenticity of the user is verified, the OGSA-DAI data
service performs user authorization.
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Figure 20: Accessing a data resource through OGSA-DAI

Figure 20 shows how an authenticated user can access a data resource named
‘Data Resource 1’ using OGSA-DAI. For each data resource, a role-map file is
maintained which contains the information for mapping a Grid user identity to a
username and a password that are used to connect to the database at a particular
authorization level. The user can submit the queries (in a perform document) to the
OGSA-DAI data service along with the data resource he/she wishes to access. The
OGSA-DAI data service then retrieves the role-map file corresponding to that data
resource and maps the user to the local database username and a password based on
his/her distinguished name. A Java Database Connectivity (JDBC) connection is then
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established between the OGSA-DAI data service and the local database. After the user
queries are executed on the local database, the results are returned to the user.
Thus, in the current implementation of OGSA-DAI, the access control
information needs to be stored for each and every resource. Multiple entries in multiple
role-map files may need to be updated if new Grid users are allowed to access multiple
data resources or if the access control information of the current users change. Also, there
is no mechanism to classify the data resources in terms of the semantic concepts, thus it is
difficult to specify access control on similar data resources.

4.1.2. Shibboleth and GridShib
Shibboleth [10] is an attribute authorization service developed by the Internet2
community for cross-organization identity federation [88]. Shibboleth creates a
distributed authorization infrastructure for Web resources, and simplifies the access
control policies and their management [4]. Shibboleth provides the user attributes, such
as role name and affiliation, to the requested resources by using the Security Assertion
Markup Language (SAML) [47] attribute statements. SAML can be used to uniformly
express authentication and authorization assertions between different security domains.
The resource providers can make authorization decisions by using the user attributes,
unlike the case of identity-based authorization. For example, only graduate students
studying computer science in a particular university and enrolled in a particular course
can gain access to a certain database.
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Shibboleth leverages each organization’s existing local access control and identity
management systems. Shibboleth supports single sign-on and protects the privacy of the
users by managing the user attributes and performing user authentication at the user’s
home institution. By using Shibboleth, the user attribute information is managed by the
home institution alone, not by the individual resource providers. The user is authenticated
by his/her home institution and the user attributes are provided to the requested resource
providers within and outside the home institution. And the users do not have to maintain
the accounts at different resources, as their role in the home institution determines their
permissions on the resources [77].
Shibboleth allows pseudonymous interaction between users, thus protecting
individual privacy while still providing basic security for the resource providers [88]. The
Shibboleth IdP maps a user name and attributes onto a unique identifying handle. To
protect the user’s privacy, the service can restrict the information about the holder of the
handle, depending on who is asking for the information. For example, it does not release
the user’s name except to those requestors who have been authorized [28]. A user could
be issued a set of pseudonym identities [88], and he/she could be authenticated at
different sites with different identities. The information that binds the set of pseudonym
identities to the handle should be maintained securely and can be used when security
violations occur.
GridShib [88] is a software system that interfaces Shibboleth and Grid services.
For this purpose, it provides two interfaces, one for the Grid services (GridShib-data
service interface) and the other for Shibboleth (GridShib-Shibboleth interface). Through
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these two interfaces, the request for user attributes is submitted to Shibboleth, and the
SAML attribute statement is returned to the Grid service.

4.1.3. Semantic Web Technologies
The Semantic Web is an evolving extension of the World Wide Web in which the
semantics of information and services on the Web is defined, making it possible for the
Web to understand and satisfy the requests of people and machines to use the Web
content [7]. The Semantic Web provides a common framework that allows data to be
shared and reused across diverse domains. Semantic Web technologies can be used to
resolve the heterogeneity in terminology when the data in various locations and various
formats are integrated.
One of the basic components of Semantic Web is ontology. Ontology is an
explicit and formal specification of a conceptualization [25], and we can create an
ontology to describe the concepts and the relationships between them in a certain domain.
Ontology consists of classes (or concepts), relations, instances of classes, and axioms;
hence it can be defined as a 4-tuple <C, R, I, A>, where C is a set of classes, R is a set of
relations, I is a set of instances, and A is a set of axioms [14].
Each resource on the Semantic Web involves metadata. Resource Description
Framework (RDF) [66] is a W3C standard for the notation of metadata descriptions of the
Web-based resources. RDF Schema (RDFS) [67] was subsequently developed so that
structured information could be represented using RDF syntax. RDFS is based on the
concept of class and inheritance, and it features simple constructs for describing
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ontologies. The W3C standard for describing ontologies on the Semantic Web is the Web
Ontology Language (OWL) [56], which supports richer semantics on top of RDFS. OWL
is a semantic markup language for publishing and sharing ontologies on the Web, and it
provides mechanisms for creating all the components of an ontology: classes, instances,
relations and axioms. OWL has three increasingly expressive sublanguages: OWL Lite,
OWL DL, and OWL Full.
Integrated tools, such as Jena [31], Sesame [76] and Pellet [59], are available for
using RDF, RDFS and OWL. They provide inference capability as well as query
languages, such as SPARQL [79], for querying the RDF stores. Simple inference is
possible in RDFS and OWL based on inheritance. More complex rules require the use of
rule languages. Rule languages allow users to write rules to reason about individual
entities and to infer new knowledge about them. Several rule languages, such as Semantic
Web Services Language (SWSL) [81], Rule Markup Language (RuleML) [69] and
Semantic Web Rule Language (SWRL) [27], are available. The rule language part of
SWSL is based on the frame logic and high-order logic programming. RuleML permits
both forward-chaining (bottom-up) and backward-chaining (top-down) inference
methods for deduction, rewriting, and further inferential and transformational tasks [69].
SWRL is a combination of the sublanguages of OWL with the sublanguages of RuleML.
Our proposed architecture is based on OWL and SWRL.
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4.2. Related Work in Access Control
Grid environments are formed in a dynamic manner, where both users and data
resources may join or leave the VO in an ad-hoc manner. Traditional access control
models are not efficient enough to deal with the Data Grids with a huge amount of
heterogeneous data resources, where new data resources are incorporated to the system
dynamically. Moreover, different data resources may need different access control
policies, and those policies may change frequently. To address these issues, several new
access control methods have been proposed for Data Grids [44, 61], but not many of
them are using semantics.
The semantic access control (SAC) model [90, 91] uses different layers of
metadata to take advantage of the semantics of the clients, resources, context and
attribute certificates. They used semantic policy language (SPL), which is an XML-based
language, to specify the access control policies for Web Services. However, SPL does not
provide powerful metadata representation and reasoning capabilities [62].
In [75], the authors propose the use of semantic access certificates for medical
applications in Grid environments. The semantic access certificates contain the access
control policies based on the roles of the user and the semantics of the stored data.
However, this method is focused on medical applications, and they did not use a standard
for the representation of metadata.
KAoS [85] is a policy and domain services framework which uses OWL to
represent authorization policies. However, using OWL as the basis for representing and
reasoning about access control policies in Data Grids may not be efficient because OWL
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is not designed for the specification of access control policies. Also, the gap between the
specification and the actual implementation of such policies cannot be coped with
automatically [84]. Another issue is that KAoS is deployed as an independent Grid
service, so a client needs to register with that service in order to access the resources [86].
Rei [35] is a policy framework which integrates policy specification and
reasoning. The policy specification language of Rei (version 2.0) is based on OWL-Lite
and uses a rule-based approach to specify access control policies as constraints over the
actions on resources [68]. The rule-based approach enables the definition of policies that
refer to a dynamically determined value, thus providing flexibility in policy specification.
The policy engine of Rei reasons over the policies and the domain knowledge in RDF
and OWL. However, the rules have a specific syntactic form, so they should be processed
differently from OWL [83].
In [13], the authors proposed to incorporate ontology-based descriptions of
resources and subjects into XACML policies. However, they used RDFS which supports
less semantics than OWL. In [62], the authors used an extension of the XACML standard
to simplify the specification and maintenance of attribute-based access control policies by
providing an ontology-based attribute management system. However, they did not
include actual resources and the policy enforcement point in their scenario.
In [57], the authors presented Semantic Access Control Enabler (SACE) which is
based on RBAC. It allows the user to query the database by using the terms other than
those specified in the database schema. The role of the user can also be specified by using
a term not present in the role-hierarchy. It uses OWL to represent the ontology. However,
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this approach cannot be deployed where the mediator service cannot be trusted, and it is
mainly based on converting the query attributes.

4.3. Semantic-based Access Control Using Shibboleth, XACML
and Ontology
We propose a semantic-based access control system for data resources in OGSADAI by using Shibboleth, XACML and ontology. The proposed access control system
makes the authorization decisions based on the user’s request, the access control policy
specified in XACML, and the semantic mappings/relationships represented in OWL. The
original implementation of OGSA-DAI uses the Grid user identity for access control,
which clearly does not support privacy protection. With our system, the user does not
need to send the user identity and can control what information is released by the
Shibboleth IdP to the resource providers. In some cases, the resource provider may only
need to know that the user is a member of an organization in order to make the access
control decision. In that case, only the membership information will be released to the
resource provider. Thus, the resource provider is given only as much user information as
needed to make the access control decision, and the privacy can be protected.

4.3.1. eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML)
XACML is a widely used standard for representing attribute-based access control
policies. The XACML specification [52] defines both a language model and a data-flow
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model. The XACML language model defines the following main components to
represent policies:
(1) A <PolicySet> contains a set of access control policies or other policy sets.
(2) A <Policy> represents an access control policy described through a set of rules.
(3) A <Rule> represents an access rule or permission. The effect of a rule is either permit
or deny.
An XACML <PolicySet>, <Policy> or <Rule> may contain a <Target> element.
A <Target> element specifies a set of subjects, resources, actions and environments to
which the <PolicySet>, <Policy> or <Rule> is applied [52].
Figure 21 shows a sample policy in XACML v3.0 which specifies that users with
the administrator role have read and write permissions on the Phonebook resource.
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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<Policy xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:schema:os"
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
PolicyId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:example:policyid:policy1"
RuleCombiningAlgId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:rule-combining-algorithm:deny-overrides">
<Rule RuleId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:example:ruleid:rule1" Effect="Permit">
<Target>
<AnyOf>
<AllOf>
<Match MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal">
<AttributeValue
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">administrator</AttributeValue>
<AttributeDesignator Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject-category:access-subject"
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:example:attribute:role"
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/>
</Match>
</AllOf>
</AnyOf>
<AnyOf>
<AllOf>
<Match MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal">
<AttributeValue
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">Phonebook</AttributeValue>
<AttributeDesignator Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:attribute-category:resource"
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:resource:target-namespace"
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/>
</Match>
</AllOf>
</AnyOf>
<AnyOf>
<AllOf>
<Match MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal">
<AttributeValue
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">read</AttributeValue>
<AttributeDesignator Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:attribute-category:action"
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id"
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/>
</Match>
</AllOf>
<AllOf>
<Match MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal">
<AttributeValue
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">write</AttributeValue>
<AttributeDesignator Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:attribute-category:action"
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id"
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/>
</Match>
</AllOf>
</AnyOf>
</Target>
</Rule>
</Policy>

Figure 21: An example XACML policy
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4.3.2. Creation of Ontology Using Web Ontology Language (OWL) and
Semantic Web Rule Language (SWRL)
OWL can be used to represent all the components of ontology: classes, instances,
relationships and axioms [55]. Classes are defined in OWL using owl:Class element. For
example, a Customer class can be defined as <owl:Class rdf:about="Customer"/>.
Classes in OWL can be organized in a hierarchy based on the superclass-subclass
relationships. OWL has two predefined classes: <owl:Thing>, which is the most general
class, and <owl:Nothing>, which is an empty class. The Customer class is thus a subclass
of <owl:Thing> and a superclass of <owl:Nothing>.
Instances of classes are the actual entities and are referred to as individuals. An
instance is created by declaring it as a member of a class. OWL does not have a unique
name assumption, i.e., different names may refer to the same individual. For example,
Matt and Mathew may refer to the same individual. This ambiguity can be resolved using
<owl:SameAs> and <owl:DifferentFrom>, which assert that an individual is same as or
different from the other individual, respectively.
In OWL, there are two main categories of properties regarding the instances:
datatype properties, which relate instances to datatype values, and object properties,
which relate instances to other instances. Properties can have a specified domain and
range. OWL uses a built-in XML schema for datatypes, which is referenced using the
URI: http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema. The following is an example of a datatype
property, specifying numItemsPurchased is a non-negative integer.
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<owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="numItemsPurchased">
<rdfs:range
rdf:resource="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#nonNegativeInteger"/>
</owl:DatatypeProperty>

The following is an example of an object property, which relates the customers to
the regions they are located in.
<owl:ObjectProperty rdf:ID="locatedIn">
<rdfs:domain rdf:resource=" #Customer" />
<rdfs:range rdf:resource="#Region"/>
</owl:ObjectProperty>

In OWL, we can define property restrictions to restrict individuals that belong to a
class [55]. There are three types of property restrictions: quantifier restrictions, such as
<owl:someValuesFrom> and <owl:allValuesFrom>; cardinality restrictions, such as
<owl:minCardinality>, <owl:maxCardinality>; and hasValue restriction denoted by
<owl:hasValue>. The following is an example of a restriction, which specifies that for all
instances of OhioCustomers, if they have a locatedIn property, then the location has to be
an OhioRegion.
<owl:Class rdf:ID="OhioCustomers">
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="Customer"/>
<rdfs:subClassOf>
<owl:Restriction>
<owl:onProperty rdf:resource="#locatedIn" />
<owl:allValuesFrom rdf:resource="#OhioRegion" />
</owl:Restriction>
</rdfs:subClassOf>
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</owl:Class>

OWL

provides

additional

constructors

such

as

<owl:unionOf>,

<owl:intersectionOf>, <owl:complementOf>, <owl:oneOf> and <owl:disjointWith> to
form classes [55]. The unionOf defines a class as a union of other classes.

The

intersectionOf defines a class as an intersection of other classes. The complementOf
defines a class as a complement of other class. The oneOf defines a class by enumerating
its members, and no other individual can be declared to belong to this class. The
disjointWith defines that a class is disjoint with other classes. The following example
states that the class Man is disjoint with the class Woman:
<owl:Class rdf:about="#Man">
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="#Woman"/>
</owl:Class>

OWL also contains class axioms such as subClassOf, equivalentClasses,
disjointClasses, and disjointUnion. The subClassOf axiom states that one class is a
subclass of another class. For example, Customer and agent classes could be stated as
subclasses of Person class, as shown in Figure 22. The equivalentClasses axiom states
that a set of classes are equivalent. The disjointClasses axiom states that a set of classes
are disjoint. The disjointUnion axiom defines a class as a union of other classes, all of
which are pair-wise disjoint.

76

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE rdf:RDF [
<!ENTITY owl "http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#">
<!ENTITY rdf "http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#">
<!ENTITY rdfs "http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#">
<!ENTITY company "http://xxx/company.owl">
<!ENTITY xsd "http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#">
]>
<rdf:RDF xml:base="&company;"
xmlns:owl="&owl;"
xmlns:rdf="&rdf;"
xmlns:rdfs="&rdfs;">
<!-- Ontology Information -->
<owl:Class rdf:about="Phonebook">
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#book"/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="Person"/>
<owl:Class rdf:about="EmployeePhonebook">
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#Phonebook"/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="Customer">
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#Person"/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="CustomerPhonebook">
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#Phonebook"/>
</owl:Class>
…
<owl:Class rdf:about="agent">
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#Person"/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:about="field_agent">
<rdfs:equivalentClassOf rdf:resource="#agent"/>
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#Person"/>
</owl:Class>
</rdf:RDF>

Figure 22: A part of a company's ontology in OWL
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<swrl:Imp>
<swrl:head>
<swrl:AtomList>
<rdf:first>
<swrl:DatavaluedPropertyAtom>
<swrl:argument2 rdf:datatype="&xsd;boolean">true</swrl:argument2>
<swrl:propertyPredicate rdf:resource="#wholeSaleCustomer"/>
<swrl:argument1 rdf:resource="#x"/>
</swrl:DatavaluedPropertyAtom>
</rdf:first>
</swrl:AtomList>
</swrl:head>
<swrl:body>
<swrl:AtomList>
<rdf:first>
<swrl:DatavaluedPropertyAtom>
<swrl:argument2 rdf:resource="#a"/>
<swrl:propertyPredicate rdf:resource="#urn:example:numItemsPurchased"/>
<swrl:argument1 rdf:resource="#x"/>
</swrl:DatavaluedPropertyAtom>
</rdf:first>
<rdf:rest>
<swrl:AtomList>
<rdf:first>
<swrl:BuiltinAtom>
<swrl:builtin rdf:resource="&swrlb;greaterThanOrEqual"/>
<swrl:arguments>
<rdf:Description>
<rdf:type rdf:resource="&rdf;List"/>
<rdf:first rdf:resource="#a"/>
<rdf:rest>
<rdf:Description>
<rdf:type rdf:resource="&rdf;List"/>
<rdf:first rdf:datatype="&xsd;nonNegativeInteger">500</rdf:first>
</rdf:Description>
</rdf:rest>
</rdf:Description>
</swrl:arguments>
</swrl:BuiltinAtom>
</rdf:first>
</swrl:AtomList>
</rdf:rest>
</swrl:AtomList>
</swrl:body>
</swrl:Imp>

Figure 23: An example SWRL rule
We used OWL to represent the metadata about the resources and user attributes.
For example, the ontology shown in Figure 22 specifies that EmployeePhonebook and
CustomerPhonebook classes are subclasses of Phonebook class, so they are inheriting the
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properties and relationships of Phonebook. Similarly, the relationships between the
values of a user attribute, such as user’s role or affiliation, can also be specified in an
ontology. For example, field_agent could be specified as equivalent to agent.
For reasoning, in addition to inheritance, complex rules can be specified for
classes by using SWRL. For example, Figure 23 includes an SWRL rule stating that if a
customer has purchased more than 500 items, then the customer is considered as a
wholesale customer.

4.3.3. Proposed Architecture
In our system, Shibboleth manages the user attribute information, grants the
users’ memberships on VO roles, and then authorizes them to use the privileges of those
roles. For example, as shown in Figure 24, Shibboleth can return an SAML attribute
which indicates that the role of the user is administrator. Thus, the resource provider is
given only as much user information as needed to make the access control decision, and
the privacy of the user can be protected.

SAMLAttribute
{
name='urn:mace:dir:attribute-def:role'
namespace='urn:mace:shibboleth:1.0:attributeNamespace:uri'
value #1 ='administrator@abc.org'
}

Figure 24: An example SAML attribute returned by Shibboleth
In traditional systems, an organization’s entire security policy is managed by a
single central authority; however, in a VO, its security policy is distributed across its
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member organizations. Thus, it may be necessary to manage the user attributes across
different organizations and to aggregate them for an authorization decision. Shibboleth
allows the VO to manage different subsets of its attribute space at different member
organizations, as each member organization operates a Shibboleth service. The use of
Shibboleth also ensures the privacy of users, as the individual user information is solely
administered at the user’s home organization and not by the individual resource
providers.

Attribute
Space
3. Return user
attributes
1. Submit queries in
an XML document
User

2. Request user
attributes
OGSA-DAI
data service
exposing the
data resources

12. Return results
11. Execute queries
and return results
Resource 1

Semanti
c
Interface
6. Extended
5. User
user attributes
attributes
and resource
and resource

Ontology

Shibboleth

10. JDBC
connection
based on the
authorization
decision

4. Request
authorization decision

XACML
Policy Engine

9. Return authorization
decision
7. Request policy
information
Resource n

DB n

DB 1

DB n

. . .
Role-map
file 1

Authorization
Decision System
(ADS)

Role-map
file n

Figure 25: Proposed architecture
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Our system uses the metadata about the data resources and user attributes into
consideration before making an access control decision. Our proposed architecture is
shown in Figure 25. The user contacts the OGSA-DAI data service and submits the
perform document along with the name of the data resource (e.g., EmployeePhonebook)
he/she wishes to access. The OGSA-DAI data service then contacts the Shibboleth IdP
(through the GridShib interface) to retrieve the user attributes. The OGSA-DAI data
service then contacts the Authorization Decision System (ADS) to obtain an access
control decision, by sending the user request and user attributes. The ADS retrieves the
ontology information of both data resources and user attributes from the semantic
interface, which looks up the ontology and invokes an inference engine. The ADS then
retrieves the corresponding XACML policy information from the XACML policy store.
<Request xmlns="urn:XACML3.vineela.wsu.org">
<Attributes Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject-category:access-subject">
<Attribute AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:attribute:role">
<AttributeValue
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">administrator</AttributeValue>
</Attribute>
</Attributes>
<Attributes Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:attribute-category:resource">
<Attribute AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:resource:resource-id" includeInResult="true">
<AttributeValue
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">EmployeePhonebook</AttributeValue>
</Attribute>
</Attributes>
<Attributes Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:attribute-category:action">
<Attribute AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id">
<AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">read</AttributeValue>
</Attribute>
</Attributes>
</Request>

Figure 26: A user request sent to the XACML policy engine
For decision making, a XACML policy engine [78] is used to evaluate the user
request against the XACML policy. The XACML policy engine takes the user request
containing the user attributes and the actions on the data resource. An example request
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for a user in administrator role seeking read access to EmployeePhonebook resource is as
shown in Figure 26.
If the decision cannot be made on the original user request, then ADS modifies it
using the semantic information (i.e., mappings) and sends it to the XACML policy engine
again for evaluation. For example, if the administrator role can perform read and write
on the Phonebook (as specified in Figure 21), then the ADS can allow the user with the
administrator role to perform those actions on the EmployeePhonebook because it is a
subclass of the Phonebook. The ADS returns the decision to the OGSA-DAI data service,
which then establishes a connection to the requested data resource.
The data flow in our system is as follows:
1. The user sends the queries (in a perform document) along with the data resource
name (e.g., EmployeePhonebook) to the OGSA-DAI data service.
2. The OGSA-DAI data service then contacts the Shibboleth server at the user’s home
institution to obtain the user attributes.
3. The Shibboleth IdP retrieves the user attributes from the attribute space and returns
the attributes to the resource provider in the SAML format (e.g., attribute-role:
administrator).
4. To determine whether the user’s request is allowed or not, the OGSA-DAI data
service requests the Authorization Decision System (ADS) to make a decision.
5. The ADS invokes the semantic interface to obtain ontology information related to the
data resource and user attributes.
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6. The semantic interface looks up the ontology and performs the inference to obtain the
concepts and the corresponding mappings for the data resource and user attributes.
For example, EmployeePhonebook can be mapped to Phonebook. Then, the semantic
interface returns the mappings to the ADS.
7. The ADS then retrieves the corresponding access control policy of the data resource
from the XACML policy store.
8. The ADS makes an authorization decision based on the access rules specified in the
XACML policy and the semantic information pertaining to the user request.
9. The ADS returns permit or deny to the OGSA-DAI data service.
10. The OGSA-DAI data service establishes a JDBC connection to the requested data
resource if the access control decision returned from the ADS is permit. Otherwise,
the user’s request is denied.
11. After the JDBC connection is established, the requested operations are executed on
the data resource, and the results are returned to the OGSA-DAI data service.
12. The OGSA-DAI data service then returns the results to the user.
Our access control system is secure because only the user requests that are
confirming to the access control policy are authorized. Moreover, all the user requests
that are authorized by the original OGSA-DAI (without using semantics) would be
authorized by our access control system. That is, our access control system does not
impose any additional limitation on the access to the data resources.
Our proposed system uses a single ontology for access control, hence we do not
need to resolve the conflict between different ontologies regarding class relationships.
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Suppose that an access control policy in our system states that the user with an attribute
value V1 can access a data resource R1. Then, the user with an attribute value V2 is
allowed to access a data resource R2 only if V2 is an equivalent class or a subclass of V1
and/or R2 is an equivalent class or a subclass of R1. This is because if V2 (R2) is a subclass
of V1 (R1) then V2 (R2) inherits the properties of V1 (R1).
For example, Phonebook can be specified as a subclass of book, and manager can
be specified as subclass of administrator. In this case, if an access control policy allows
an administrator to access Phonebook, then both manager and administrator can access
Phonebook and its subclass EmployeePhonebook, but cannot access book because book is
a superclass of Phonebook. Thus, the use of ontology in our access control system does
not allow unauthorized user requests.
However, a compromised Shibboleth IdP may provide the user attributes such that
the user is mapped to a role that allows him/her to access the data resources which are not
allowed otherwise. This problem can be avoided by monitoring the log files and checking
for illegal access patterns. If a Shibboleth IdP is found to be compromised, then the
OGSA-DAI data service can remove it from the list of trusted servers and deny all the
user requests originating from the organization hosting the compromised Shibboleth IdP.

4.4. Implementation Details
We implemented our proposed access control system with OGSA-DAI, Shibboleth,
XACML, and OWL. We deployed the OGSA-DAI data service in the Globus Toolkit
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container. Our proposed system uses the GSI authentication, so if a user tries to access
the OGSA-DAI data service using an expired or invalid proxy credential, then the
authentication fails and his/her request will be denied.
An example client session is as shown in Figure 27. The user invokes grid-proxyinit to create a user proxy credential, which is generated based on the user certificate. The
user

then

contacts

the

OGSA-DAI

data

service

at

the

(https://pc2.cs.wright.edu:8484/wsrf/services/ogsadai/DataService)

designated
along

with

URL
the

identity of the data resource (PhoneBook) and the perform document (fileAccess.xml)
containing the actions to be executed on the data resource. In this example, the
communication between the client and OGSA-DAI data service uses transport level
security and encryption.

user@pc1>grid-proxy-init
Your identity: /O=Grid/OU=GlobusTest/OU=simpleCApc1.cs.wright.edu/OU=cs.wright.edu/CN=Vineela Muppavarapu
Enter GRID pass phrase for this identity:
Creating proxy ................................................................................ Done
Your proxy is valid until: Wed Aug 5 09:32:50 2009
user@pc1>ant dataServiceClient
-Ddai.url=https://pc2.cs.wright.edu:8484/wsrf/services/ogsadai/DataService
-Ddai.resource.id=PhoneBook
-Ddai.action=examples/Perform/Files/fileAccess.xml -Ddai.tls=encryption

Figure 27: Example Client-session

For authorization, our proposed system utilizes the user attributes issued by the
Shibboleth IdP. The OGSA-DAI data service contacts the Shibboleth IdP to obtain the
attributes of the authenticated user. If the Shibboleth IdP and the OGSA-DAI data service
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trust each other, then the Shibboleth IdP releases the user attributes through the GridShib
interface [88]. Otherwise, no user attributes are released.
The current implementation uses the pull model, where the user contacts the
OGSA-DAI data service that retrieves the user attributes from the Shibboleth IdP. The
main advantage of the pull model is that it can be easily deployed and the user does not
even need to know that Shibboleth is involved in the decision making. We installed the
Shibboleth IdP and deployed it in a Web container. So, any Web service or Web
application running on a Web server can contact the Shibboleth IdP on behalf of the
client (or user) to obtain the user attributes.
We used Sun’s XACML policy engine [80] along with the SICSACML patch [78]
to support XACML version 3.0. For the inference on ontology, we used both Jena and
Pellet. Jena supports SPARQL better, but it does not support SWRL while Pellet does.

4.4.1. Creation and Administration of XACML Policies
Administration of XACML policies is a difficult task because each XACML
policy has several components, as shown in Figure 21, and the number of XACML
policies may be very large in Grid environment. However, no efficient tool is available
for the creation and update of XACML policies. So, we developed an XACML
administration tool and a GUI in Java. Our tool allows the user to specify a RBAC policy,
through GUI shown in Figure 28, and then it creates and stores the corresponding
XACML policy. It allows the user to update the existing XACML policies, and user can
also load existing RBAC policy database into the XACML policy store. Using this tool,
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the policy administrator can create new users, roles, resources, and actions. It allows the
administrator to change the user-role assignment and the permissions on a role..

Figure 28: XACML policy administration tool

The Figure 28 shows the graphic interface for creating and managing RBAC
policies in XACML. The RBAC policies are converted into XACML format using the
core and hierarchical RBAC profile of XACML. For each role, a Role <PolicySet> (RPS)
is created. The RPS contains the role name and the id of the corresponding Permission
<PolicySet> (PPS). The permissions of a role are represented as rules, and they are
contained in the PPS. Each rule specifies the resources and allowed actions on them. For
example, the permission read on PhoneBook resource is represented as a <Rule> as
shown in Figure 29.
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<Rule Effect="Permit" RuleId="Permission:to:write:on:file1">
<Target>
<AnyOf>
<AllOf>
<Match MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal">
<AttributeValue
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">Phonebook</AttributeVal
ue>
<AttributeDesignator
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:resource:resource-id"
Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:attribute-category:resource"
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/>
</Match>
</AllOf>
</AnyOf>
<AnyOf>
<AllOf>
<Match MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal">
<AttributeValue
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">read</AttributeValue>
<AttributeDesignator
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id"
Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:attribute-category:action"
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/>
</Match>
</AllOf>
</AnyOf>
</Target>
</Rule>
Figure 29: XACML representation of a permission

4.5. Performance Analysis
We have configured the server-side of OGSA-DAI to use Shibboleth. The OGSADAI server has been modified to obtain the user attributes from the Shibboleth IdP and
communicate with the Authorization Decision System (ADS). The ADS retrieves the
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policy information from the XACML policy store and then evaluates the user request to
make an authorization decision.
The overheads incurred with our proposed access control system are compared
with those of the existing authorization system of OGSA-DAI. Our performance analysis
is based on the parameters used for the profiling and benchmarking of the components of
OGSA-DAI as described in [30]. Also, as only security aspects are changed by our
implementation, we measured the overheads of the security components.
In our system, OGSA-DAI WSRF Release 2.2 was deployed in the Globus
Toolkit 4.0.7 container running on a Linux machine with a dual-core 2.8 GHz Intel
Pentium processor and 2 GB of RAM. Shibboleth IdP 1.3.3 was configured to run on
SSL-enabled Apache 1.2.21 and Tomcat 5.5.23 servers. For the purpose of analysis, we
created an ontology containing 272 classes and used a perform document containing a
request to read from a 600 KB text file.

4.5.1. Profiling Details
A Java method System.currentTimeMillis() is used to get the current system time
in milliseconds. Also, for the server-side analysis, the Apache Log4j logger is used to log
the time in milliseconds. For more accuracy, the Tomcat, Apache and Globus Toolkit
containers are shut down and restarted before each client request, in order to minimize
the caching effects within Globus Toolkit, OGSA-DAI and Shibboleth. The main change
from the original configuration of OGSA-DAI is the way authorization is performed at
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the server-side. Hence, only the security aspects of the client and the server are profiled
and analyzed.
Globus Toolkit uses GSI which allows two levels of security: transport-level and
message-level. In transport-level security, the entire communication channel between the
client and the server is encrypted. In message-level security, only the message is
encrypted, so it has flexibility that the message can be transmitted over any transport. The
message-level security offers more features than the transport-level security, but it takes
more time as each message needs to be encrypted. The performance is analyzed based on
these two levels of security established between the client and the server as shown below.
For each of these two levels, we recorded the times taken with and without using the
Shibboleth and ADS.
1) TLS: Enforces GSI secure conversation between the client and the server of
OGSA-DAI with transport-level security and encryption.
2) MLS: Enforces GSI secure conversation between the client and the server of
OGSA-DAI with message-level security and encryption.

4.5.2. Client-side Security
A call is made to the OGSA-DAI data service for each of the two security levels
with and without using the Shibboleth and ADS. In case of using the Shibboleth and
ADS, additional overhead exists for contacting the Shibboleth IdP, retrieving user
attributes, and evaluating the user request against the XACML policy by utilizing
ontology. The getVersion method of the data service returns the version of OGSA-DAI
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used. The getResourceIDs method of the data service returns the list of resources hosted
by the data service. The perform method of the data service takes the perform document,
which contains the user query, and returns the result to the client.
GSI secure conversation requires a security context to be established between the
client and the server. The overheads incurred in setting up this security context are
analyzed based on the following:
1.

A call to the setConnection method to establish the connection with the data
service.

Time (milliseconds)

2. Calls to the getVersion, getResourceIDs and perform methods.
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Figure 30: Client-side security

The corresponding times are shown in Figure 30, and as observed, the time taken
by the setConnection method is almost the same. It involves connecting to the data
service at the given URL, retrieving its information, and determining the specification of
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Web services used for the OGSA-DAI distribution. As this process does not require any
authorization, it takes almost the same time regardless of the security enforced by the
data service. The calls to the getVersion, getResourceIDs and perform take longer when
the Shibboleth and ADS are used because the user attributes need to be retrieved from the
Shibboleth IdP, and then the user request is evaluated to determine whether the user is
authorized to perform the requested operation. When the Shibboleth and ADS are not
used, authorization is performed using a role-map file which maps the Grid user identity
to a local user account.
The times for executing the getVersion method are longer compared with other
methods, because it takes time to retrieve the user attributes from the Shibboleth IdP. The
later calls take less time as they may require the same user attributes that are obtained
previously and cached by the data service.

4.5.3. Server-side Security
The analysis made on the server-side is based on the following:
1. Times taken for retrieving user attributes from the Shibboleth service during
the getVersion, getResourceIDs and perform method calls.
2. Time to evaluate the request by using ontology and XACML policy.
3. Time taken for the perform operation.
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Figure 31: Server-side security
Figure 31 shows the corresponding times taken for the OGSA-DAI data service
with and without the Shibboleth and ADS. The data service with the Shibboleth and ADS
contacts the Shibboleth IdP to obtain the user attributes during the getVersion,
getResourceIDs and perform method calls, and the corresponding times are denoted by
shibGetVersion, shibGetResourceIDs and shibPerform in Figure 31. The user attributes
obtained to make a call to getVersion method can be cached by the data service, and then
reused by the same client, for the subsequent calls to getResourceIDs and perform
methods. So, it takes less time for those methods.
When the Shibboleth and ADS are not used, this overhead is not incurred as the
data service does not use the user attributes for authorization. Instead, the server obtains
the user’s Grid identity, known as distinguished name (DN), and maps it to a local user
account using a role-map file. To retrieve the user’s DN, the server tries to obtain the
user’s proxy credential using the transport-level security mechanism. If that fails, then the
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server tries to obtain the user’s DN using the message-level security mechanism. If these
two attempts are unsuccessful, the server determines that the client does not have any
security context setup, but may allow anonymous access based on “No Certificate
Provided.” The mapping of a DN to a local user account usually takes less than a
millisecond, so it is not shown in Figure 31.
The data service with the Shibboleth and ADS authorizes the user request by
evaluating it using the XACML policy and ontology. The time required for this
evaluation is usually very small, as shown in Figure 31. The time taken for the actual
perform operation is the same for the data services with and without using the Shibboleth
and ADS.

4.6. Summary
We proposed a semantic-based access control system for OGSA-DAI by using
Shibboleth, XACML and ontology to reduce administration overhead and to achieve
greater interoperability in Data Grids. By using the established XACML standard, we can
represent the access control policies of different VOs uniformly. And, by using semantics
for access control, the permissions can be associated with the concepts, instead of
individual objects, thus resolving the differences in terminologies and reducing the
burden on the administrator. We also developed an XACML policy administration tool
for creating the XACML policies from existing RBAC policies and managing them.
Our performance analysis shows that the proposed access control system incurs a
small overhead in evaluating the user request. However, this overhead is quite acceptable
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when we consider the benefits of our system, such as the scalability in terms of the
number of users and data resources and reduced administration overheads of the resource
providers. For a complex query on a large database, this overhead is very small compared
to the execution time of the perform document.
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5. CONCLUSION
In this dissertation, we developed a semantic and role-based access control system
for Data Grids. Our proposed access control system resolves certain issues, such as
scalability, privacy protection, principle of least privilege and interoperability. Our
proposed systems are based on role-based access control and hence access control
decisions are based on user roles instead of user identities, thus improving the scalability.
By using Shibboleth, our system protects the privacy of the users because Shibboleth
allows the user attributes to be maintained by the home institution alone and not by
individual resources. Our role-based access control system supports the principle of least
privilege, i.e., the users are given only those privileges required for completing a certain
set of tasks.
Next, our semantic-based access control system resolves two major problems. The
first problem is that different organizations may use different terminologies in describing
their resources and user roles. The second problem is that the access control policies
should be specified for individual data resources. Our systems allow quick and easy
deployments, and supports privacy protection of the users. Our performance analysis
shows that the systems add a small overhead to the existing authorization infrastructures
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of OGSA-DAI and SRB while improving the scalability and reducing the administration
overhead.
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6. FUTURE WORK
Existing databases store XACML policy as an XML file or object. Storage,
administration, and management of XACML policies, creates unique demands that are
not addressed, including resolving the association between the policies. Creation of
XACML policy is itself a significant challenge for administrators, as there are no tools
available for creation and verification of these policies. Additionally, as users and
policies change frequently in dynamic environments, storing the XACML policy as an
XML file is not an optimal way for managing the policies. In future, as more and more
organizations adopt the XACML standard it is important to address these issues and
design a new system that can create, store and manage the XACML policies efficiently.
As Grid involves several organizations, the distributed storage and administration of the
XACML policies has to be supported.
Privacy protection is another important challenge in today’s environment. Users
may not want to reveal their personal information to the resource providers. Lots of
research has been performed in this area, such as the use of anonymization techniques,
which protect the identity of users in data publishing. But, they do not allow users to
dynamically control the information being released to resource providers. Also, several
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resource providers do not support anonymous user access. The use of RBAC and
Shibboleth in my dissertation work addresses the privacy protection problem to certain
extent. Shibboleth supports pseudonymous user access by mapping the identity to a
pseudo-identity. However, this information is stored in a file which is not a secure way.
In our system using RBAC, policies are specified based on the roles of the user instead of
the individual identities. This protects the privacy of the user, as authorization is
performed with user roles instead of user identities. However, the correlation between the
user and roles can be easily identified by attackers by eavesdropping and phishing. This
issue can be solved by introducing user session-based pseudo-identity with Shibboleth.
Geospatial ontology [37] and time ontology [26] can be used to specify the access
control policies based on the location of the user, the resource requested, and the time at
which the request is made. Geospatial ontology represents geospatial concepts and
properties of the Web resources. Time ontology in OWL provides a vocabulary for
expressing facts about topological relations among instants and intervals, together with
information about durations, and about dates and times. For example, specification of
access control policies using ‘next-door-to’ and GPS tracking data to allow the user
access to a specific resource is not possible with the current technologies. Additionally,
Geospatial ontology is still an emerging standard and requires further research. While
most of the proposed work is targeted towards improving the access control system in
Data Grids, the proposed systems can be extended to other environments, such as cyberphysical systems and cloud computing systems.
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